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1. Introduction  
  
1.1 Research background  
 
Japan and Korea developed their economies over a period of fifty years based 
on the growth of their manufacturing sectors. Although their economies made progress, 
many hurdles remain in maintaining growth and a competitive advantage. Profits 
coming from their respective manufacturing industries continually decrease, and other 
emerging economies are lowering their prices to compete. Various indicators signal that 
the Japanese and Korean economies are in a transition period. 
At the outset of the 21
st
 century, these two countries entered into the information era 
and discovered the importance of digital content as a high value-added industry. Digital 
content has been driving the rapid market growth of information and communication 
technology (ICT) hardware, consumer electronics, mobile services, and applications 
(OECD, 2006) [1]. It is considered a tool for enhancing a country’s soft power1 as well. 
For these reasons, both governments became aware of the importance of digital content 
as an element for international competitiveness, and put effort into developing proper 
governance. 
Media content has been distributed in North America or Europe for quite some time 
due to language and cultural similarities. Since the late 1990s, major media companies 
have attempted strategic alliances and several media conglomerates have emerged, 
including Time Warner and Vivendi Universal, as shown in Table 1.1. Their business 
                                                 
1 Soft power is the ability to attract rather than coerce, use force, or give money as a means of persuasion. 
It is based on intangible or indirect influences such as culture, values, and ideology (Nye, Jr., 2004). 
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areas expanded based on digital content technology and has increased sharply through 
co-production. 
 
Table 1.1 Major media content companies and their M&A
2
 in the late 1990s 
 
(Unit: in million USD) 
Global 
Rank* 
Name Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2015 
1  AOL Time Warner    
 (2001-2003) 
US   18,194 19,069  
 
28,113  Time Warner US 8,122 17,640 18,405 - 
 Time Warner 
 Entertainment 
US 7,531 - - - 
2  The Walt Disney 
Company 
US 17,285 17,184 17,090 18,231 36,303 
3  Viacom US 9,882 9,079 9,481 15,865 12,488 
 CBS Corporation US 5,367 6,805 7,377 - 
4  Sony  Japan 16,548 15,454 11,781 14,626  
5  Vivendi Universal France - - 13,833 14,147  
 
17,600 
 Seagram/ 
 Universal  Studios 
Canada 5,455 9,000 9,400 - 
 PolyGram Netherland 5,686 3,689 - - 
6  News Corp. Australia 7,328 8,008 8,208 8,358  
7  Bertelsmann Germany 4,844 4,469 4,907 6,873 10,041 
8  GE/NBC 
 (Comcast-from 2011) 
US 5,153 5,269 5,790 6,797 19,720 
9  ARD Germany 6,295 6,327 6,215 -  
10  NHK Japan      
 
Note: *Ranked based on annual sales in 2000. 
Source: European Audiovisual Observatory. (2001). Statistical Yearbook [2]. 
 
 
Compared to other regions, East Asia has significant diversity in terms of the stages 
of economic development, scales of economies, and abundance of natural resources. 
This diversity can be a factor in generating dynamism and fostering complementary 
                                                 
2 Mergers and acquisitions 
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relationships between states. As Figure 1.1 illustrates, content market in Asia is smaller 
than EU and North America. Media content distribution within East Asia was not active 
until recently due to heterogenetic cultural backgrounds and historical conflicts, but 
over the last two decades, it has been gradually increasing. The period from the late 
1990s to the 2010s witnessed, the rapid development of ICTs and this has considerably 
modified the environment in which media content is created, reproduced, and 
distributed. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Global content market shares by region in 2012 
 
Note: based on annual sales, in million USD.  
Source: PwC (2012). Entertainment and media outlook 2012-2017 [3]. 
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1.2 Purpose of research 
 
There are two primary goals of this research. Firstly, this research aims to 
identify content distribution mechanisms among six East Asian economies
3—Japan, 
Korea
4
, mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan
5
 and Singapore—during the period of the 
late 1990s to the 2010s. A comparative analysis of the content exchange is performed 
based on trade statistics and Internet traffic data. 
The second goal is to rethink factors that stimulate content distribution at the state 
level, with a focus on Japan and Korea. The roles of technological development and 
governments’ policies are selected as disseminators of digital content in East Asia. 
Moreover, this research notes examples of the side effects of government intervention, 
and provides policy suggestions that do not trigger conflicts with other cultures or 
nationalistic protests. 
 
 
1.3 Research questions and methodologies 
 
  1.3.1 Mapping East Asia 
 
 This research develops the discourse on “East Asian content flow” and examines 
the theoretical significance of its policies. The following questions are addressed: 
Which states are the main suppliers or consumers of digital content? What do 
differences in commodities trade, service trade or Internet traffic patterns show?  
                                                 
3 Because Hong Kong and Taiwan are not classified as a state or a country, this research refers six 
separate entities as “economies.” 
4 In this research, Republic of Korea or South Korea designated as “Korea.” All data sets under this name 
exclude North Korea. 
5 This research simply refers as Taiwan, but it is officially called as the Republic of China or some 
international organizations adopt the APEC nomenclature for referring as “Chinese Taipei.”  
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There have been many attempts to map East Asian military or economic relations. 
Figure 1.2 is an example that tries analyzing relative power (political influence) and 
interactions at the regional level. However, it relatively hard to find culture related maps 
due to obstacles in quantifying soft power in East Asia. 
 
Figure 1.2 Asia-pacific power distribution networks 
 
Note: A virtual image based on political influence by states 
Source: Kim, S. et al (2011) [4]. 
 
As a first step, this research identifies the input and output of content trade at the 
state level. Trade statistics have been used as a proxy for distribution performance, in 
spite of some drawbacks, to cover a wide spectrum of cultural exchange activities. 
Focusing on changes in the “centers” and near the “boundaries,” it attempts to measure 
centrality among the relations of six East Asian states based on the trade volume 
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extracted from the United Nations (UN) Comtrade [5]. However, some content that is 
not stored on traditional media will be considered a service. Internationally comparable 
data on service trade statistics are arranged based on the Extended Balance of Payments 
Services Classification (EBOPS) provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
[6]. The EBOPS classification provides a more extensive breakdown of cultural 
activities that were not available in the past. The valuation of both databases is based on 
customs records in current American dollars (USD).  
As a second step, this research attempts to highlight the digital content that is 
available for distribution on new media. Providing an accurate estimation of the trade 
flows of digital products is a challenging task. Moreover, digital products need 
statistical refinement and development to discover alternative ways to measure these 
intangible assets. This research chooses TeleGeography’s global Internet bandwidth data 
[7] as the index to show trends in cross-border digital content distribution. Supplemental 
use of Internet traffic and bandwidth data is expected to assist in the estimation of 
digital content distribution in East Asia. 
 
 
1.3.2 Evaluating content policies 
 
 According to the map of East Asian content that will be presented in Chapters 3 
and 4, Japan dominated content networks until the early 2000s and Korea disseminated 
the Japanese influence to other East Asian states after the mid-2000s. Additionally, the 
two countries developed several government initiatives in the last ten years to enhance 
content industry and soft power. This raises the following questions: What is the 
theoretical background of government support programs for the content industry? 
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Which ministries or governmental agencies in Japan and Korea carried out content 
policies? Have content policies positively affected the content industry? What are the 
side effects of content policies on a domestic or global level?  
To answer these questions, this research finds correlation between governments’ 
policies and content distribution. This analysis is primarily based on a relevant literature 
review and case study. It is supported by documentation on Japan and Korea from the 
late 1990s through the present, government websites, newspapers, periodicals, and 
journals. At the same time, semi-structured interviews with relevant policymakers and 
experts from the private sector provide a crosscheck on internal validity when 
examining government publications.  
 
1.4 Structure and overview of the research 
 
In Chapter 2, this research attempts to classify the digital and non-digital content 
industry based on the concept of technological trajectories and the results of a 
preliminary literature search. In Chapter 3, it then identifies the leading economies by 
analyzing content imports and exports and performs a network analysis. Chapter 4 maps 
the centers and boundaries using TeleGeography’s global Internet bandwidth data [8]. 
The development of the Internet removed the market dominance of traditional mass 
media, so this research tries to compare trade and Internet traffic data. 
Chapter 5 reviews the discussion on the organizational and structural traits of 
Japanese and Korean digital content policies. It identifies the historical background and 
specific examples of policy competition and coordination in both countries by analyzing 
their governmental organizations and relevant laws. Chapter 6 seeks to examine cases 
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where digital content policies show one of the primary objectives of policy efficiency. 
With a comparative analysis of the Cool Japan strategy and the culture technology 
initiatives of Korea, this chapter introduces examples of the structural holes that 
occurred at specific stages of technological development. It can be said that there are 
certain side effects from the content policies at the domestic level. Chapter 7 discusses 
international competition and cyber nationalism as cultural interactions or side effects of 
the content policies at the global level. This hints at the possibility that a new process is 
overtaking functionalism, where order shifts from an economic to a political and 
cultural community. 
This research discusses a prominent example of digital convergence and policy 
implications that should be considered when new technology makes an appearance in 
the future. There are not many empirical studies on content policies, especially focused 
on digitalization and based on comparative research between Japan and Korea. By 
quantifying exchange relations between two states within East Asia, this research 
attempts to apply both quantitative and qualitative methods that can measure the amount 
of commercial and non-commercial as well as digital and non-digital content. 
In recent years, most East Asian economies including China, Taiwan, and Singapore, 
have prepared various content policies. Examples from Japan and Korea are expected to 
provide meaningful lessons to this region and thus should be examined in detail. 
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2. Theoretical Background  
 
2.1 Conceptual framework 
 
2.1.1 Digital content 
 
Digital content refers to any information that is published or distributed in a 
digital form, including text data, sound recordings, photographs and images, motion 
pictures, and software (OECD, 2006) [1]. The boundary of digital content is 
overlapping with “media content” that distributed both digital and non-digital media 
platforms, and “cultural goods” that defined by UNESCO [9]. Companies providing 
digital content are usually called as the content industry in Japan and Korea, but it may 
variously be referred to as the culture/cultural industry or digital media industry. This 
concept is sometimes replaced as “creative industry” that mainly called in the United 
Kingdom, or “entertainment and media industry” that classified in the United States and 
some private research institutes including Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC). These 
designations themselves have sometimes been a contested issue, and even reflected the 
perception gap by stakeholders. Furthermore, the boundary of digital content is steadily 
expanding with the digital convergence, and now it including web objects (text, 
graphics, and scripts), downloadable objects (media files, software, documents), 
applications (e-commerce, portals), live streaming media, on-demand streaming media, 
and social networks (Noam, 2015).  
Nevertheless, the operational definition of content in this research includes film, 
broadcasting, music, game, publishing, and web content as the classification shown in 
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Table 3.1 that is based on the international trade data that are regarded as relatively 
conservative. This research treats general trend of media content trade in Chapter 3, and 
spotlights digitalized content in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 and 6, it mainly deals with 
policies involving digital content; it also broadly reviews the promotion policies for 
non-digital
6
 content and sometimes compares traditional and digital content policies. 
 
 
2.1.2 Network and social network analysis 
 
  A network of lines or other long thin things is a large number of them which 
cross each other. It consists of one or more nodes that connected by one or more ties 
that form distinct and analyzable patterns. Although one can draw a wide variety of 
networks, they all factor into two components: “centralized” and “distributed” as Figure 
2.1. The centralized network can be efficient but basically vulnerable since the 
destruction of the central node destroys intercommunication between the end node. 
Decentralized network shows a hierarchical structure to a set of star
7
 connected in the 
form of a larger star with an additional link forming a loop (Baran, 1964) [10]. 
Destruction of a few nodes also can destroy communication, so it should be considered 
that building networks as “distributed” as possible. 
                                                 
6 It can also refer as analog or traditional media. Instead, PwC often uses “physical” for indicating 
opposite meaning of digital. 
7 A centralized network is sometimes called as a star because of its shape. On the other hand, a distributed 
network can be described as grid or mesh. 
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Figure 2.1 Types of social network 
Source: Baran, P. (1964) “On Distributed Communications: Introduction to Distributed Communications 
Network,” RAND Memorandum [10]. 
 
In studies based on real world, network data include measurements on the 
relationships between social entities. Social network analysis (SNA) permits the 
investigation and measurement of network structures that shows persistent patterns of 
relations among nodes. In Chapter 3 and 4, this research tries analyzing content 
distribution networks among the six East Asian economies. Despite limited numbers of 
nodes (Small N), it measures centrality with six nodes and temporal dynamics of 
relations based on trade and Internet traffic. The value of SNA has been demonstrated in 
precise description of international networks for content distribution.  
 
 
 
2.1.3 Structural holes 
 
In a network, the value of contacts depends on the structural characteristics of 
the relations. About the disconnection between two groups or clusters, Burt (1992) [11] 
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used the term “structural holes.” In Figure 2.2, a structural hole intervenes as an 
information insulator between separate two social groups.  
 
Figure 2.2 The location of a structural hole 
 Source: Burt (1992); Adapted from Kung (2012) [11] [12]. 
 
Structural holes can be regarded as the menace of distributed networks. However, 
they can provide opportunities for actors linking disparate groups who are not 
interacting with each other, because social capital exists where people have an 
advantage through their location in a network. Information within networks tends not to 
be homogeneous, so a structural hole takes place where two separate clusters possess 
non-redundant information. Once a new player bridges this structural hole, the player 
can mobilize social capital by acting as a “broker” of information between separate 
clusters that would not otherwise have been in contact. Thus, bridging structural holes 
can be beneficial to the whole organization by providing new ideas and opportunities. It 
frequently occurs in organizational changes among content technologies. In Chapter 5 
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and 6, an important criterion should be to evaluate whether governmental agencies 
notice structural holes and which roles can be played among them. 
  
2.2 Literature review 
 
2.2.1 Trade and content distribution  
 
  Previous researches about media content distribution have been mainly 
concerned about its economic aspects. Economic models demonstrate that the 
dominance of media content from a larger market is inevitable, but “cultural discount” 
can serve as trade barriers. The domestic market model (Owen & Wildman, 1992 [13]; 
Dupagne & Waterman, 1998 [14]) is the explanation that the market size between two 
states is the most crucial factor on trading broadcasting content. According to their 
empirical researches, content imports were largely determined by the relative market 
size of exporting countries. In addition, Schement et al. (1984) counted international 
flow of television programs is decided from “structural conditions” and “catalytic 
actions” [15]. Structural conditions involve the proper equipment and the legal 
environment to promote content distribution; catalytic actions consist of individual or 
organizational efforts involving technologies and infrastructure to enable the content 
transfer. 
The other group of scholars under the international communication theory has been 
focused on an unbalanced distribution of content. Hoskins (1988) also analyzed the 
international distribution of US television program, and criticized its dominance 
because the largest domestic market size worked as a crucial advantage [16]. After the 
advent of digital media, the Internet was mainly responsible for a political-economic 
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transition toward “digital capitalism” and “cultural imperialism.” Schiller (1999) 
showed how Internet offered uniquely supple instruments with which to cultivate and 
deepen consumerism on a transnational scale [17]. 
In East Asia, television broadcasters tended to import more content, in total volume 
and price, from countries which have economic power until the late 1990s (Park, 2003) 
[18]. However, this trend changed to intra-regional cultural flows and consumption in 
the 2000s, and Iwabuchi (2002) found the reason from being diverse of Asian cultural 
industry in Asia [19]. It can be construed as the price and technologies as already 
pointed by Schement’s middle-range theory. This phenomenon is less focused on East 
Asia context, so this research applies Schement’s model and verifies the relations 
between government actions and content distribution in Chapter 6. Adapting 
international communication theory, disproportion of content distribution is treated as 
one of the major disciplines in Chapter 7.  
 
 
2.2.2 Internet traffic flow and digital content distribution 
 
There is a possibility that current trade data sets have measurement biases or 
lack of inter-temporal and international consistency. Especially, ICTs spurred content 
market growth in the early 2000s (PwC, 2007) [20], and the total volume of digital 
content market has grown in the past several years. As Figure 2.3 shows, it will share 
almost a half of total content market within five years. Thus, various methods were tried 
for measuring digital content distribution. Although statistical methods used to measure 
electronic transactions have been developed, much of this distribution is not captured by 
customs or balance of payments data (UNESCO, 2009) [35].  
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Figure 2.3 Global content spending on digital and non-digital: 2012 vs 2017*   
 
Note: based on annual sales, *forecast  
Source: PwC. (2012) [3]. 
 
 Moreover, digital content mainly spreads through the Internet aided by rising 
broadband penetration. Free information, non-commercialized content or even illegal 
copies distribute actively in cyberspace and often are at the center of attention in the 
society. The spin-off effect of free content is greater than traditional content trades 
sometimes, and influences to the relation of East Asian states as well.  
The Internet traffic metaphor figured in the volume of international relations (IR) 
researches. Baylis et al. (2004 and 2011) illustrated changes of the geopolitical 
superpower in the 2000s through TeleGeography’s Internet bandwidth data and telecom 
maps [21]. Mori et al (2006) chose TeleGeography’s submarine cable map and global 
Internet traffic data for analyzing necessary conditions toward East Asian regional 
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community [22]. Based on those IR researches, this research develops methodologies 
which can measure digital interaction at the state level based on TeleGeography’s global 
Internet bandwidth data in Chapter 4.  
 
2.2.3 Technologies for digital content development 
 
ICTs offer the potential for a less expensive distribution model that can result in 
significant saving in planning, creating, merchandising, delivering, and inventory 
management. In Korea, a new term “culture technology (CT)” was coined for 
illustrating those processes reflected in Figure 2.4. In a narrow sense, CT or digital 
content technologies can be referred specific visual or auditory skills for content 
creation. For content producers, encompass five senses interactive, high-quality realistic, 
immersive, interactive, virtual reality/augmented reality-based content is expected to 
evolve as the important technology to implement (Lee et al, 2011) [23]. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 ICTs roles on digital content production and distribution 
 Source: Lee et al. (2011) [23].  
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In a broad sense, various technologies for developing the digital content industry can 
be categorized under CT or digital content technologies. For content providers, 
especially rely on online distribution, wired and mobile broadband technologies make 
more participative as upload content. Also, Internet involved technologies toward 
interactive platform (Figure 2.5) are critical for sustaining or expanding their business. 
Infrastructures for micro-payment systems, electronic signatures, authentication 
technologies are essential for content marketers. These digital technologies lower entry 
barriers and a corresponding rise in new business models have facilitated the emergence 
of innovative services. In demand side, reception technologies should keep pace with 
distribution technologies constructing sustainable markets. 
  
 
Figure 2.5 Internet technologies as the platform of digital content distribution  
 
 Source: Malone Media Group (2014) [24]. 
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In exploring the questions of relations with industry and policy, this research will not 
be limited to consider technologies for strengthening intellectual property rights (IPR) 
management, cyber security and privacy, or even marketing skills especially promoting 
overseas sales as a part of content technologies. It puts distance from the technological 
determinism by pointing out the states enlarge their influence in content development. 
 
 
2.2.4 Digital content policy 
 
As reviewed in 2.1.1, digital content has complex characteristics, and its policy 
also includes aspects of “cultural policy,” “technology policy,” and “industrial policy.” 
As a result, digital content policy refers governments’ various strategic efforts to 
encourage the development of content involved technologies as well as their economy. 
Most policy issues involving digital content required collaboration across government 
ministries, sometimes causing conflicts among ministries or policy duplication that 
weakened policy effectiveness. 
 Wang (2008) argued the point that Japanese, Korean and Chinese governments fully 
understood the importance of digital content, and proposed similar strategic policies 
[25]. However, their outcomes were not the same, so it is needed to carry out policy 
evaluation. The trade statistics of industries can be one of the indicators accounting for 
the degree of policy efficiency with respect to innovation performance. Lee et al. (2008) 
used statistics data of absolute export values and trade balance of payment as indicators 
of innovation performance [26]. 
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This research compares Japanese and Korean digital content policies in Chapter 5 
and 6: implying policy competition and coordination as outcomes evaluation in Chapter 
5 and trade volume change as outputs evaluation in Chapter 6. 
 
2.2.5 Policy competition and coordination 
 
Because each sub-division of governments continually strives to maximize its 
budget as well as to extend its autonomy, interactions between different bureaucratic 
agencies or policies have been discussed in the literature under two strains: competition 
and coordination.  
Allison (1971) developed the bureaucratic politics model for understanding 
problems in foreign policy decision making. He assumed a government as a rational 
actor but competition among its agencies for protecting their own interests could have 
inefficiency [27]. Cohen et al. (1972) set up the Garbage can model under the 
organizational anarchy, characterized by “problematic preferences,” “unclear 
technology” and “fluid participation.” Even if an organization met a problem, its 
solution largely depended on the chance likening the in and out the flow of choice 
opportunities to that of a garbage can [28]. Dror (1989) suggested combining the 
rational and extra-rational factors linked with decision and situation. Through the 
optimal model, he emphasized communication and feedback channels among 
governmental agencies [29]. 
In the digital content field, inter-ministerial or inter-agency policy competition arose 
not only from jurisdiction conflicts but also from perception gaps. In Korea, MCST and 
the Ministry of Information and Communication up to 2008 had competed for 
standardization of digital content technology. On the one hand, in the case of the online 
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game rating system in Korea, philosophical differences between the Ministry of Gender 
Equity and Family (MIGEF) and MCST were also a reason for policy conflict. In 2011, 
MIGEF raised a question about prevailing juvenile cybercrime due to exposure of 
violence on video and computer games, and proposed to attend content regulation 
through a “shut down system.” Conversely, MCST which was responsible for the 
development content industry including games already introduced a “selective shut 
down system” that required online games operators to block children from playing 
during hours that their guardians set. 
Governments have struggled against policy conflicts and inefficiencies, and made 
organizational attempts at implementing integrated innovation policies. Such efforts are 
described as inter-ministerial coordination, cooperation, collaboration
8
 or integration
9
. 
Building communication and feedback channels or inter-agency councils, and even 
providing financial compensation for best practices were tried for encouraging 
ministries or agencies’ coordination. Sunada (2007) discussed the history of Japanese 
information policy mainly led by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). 
She divided into five periods from 1954 onwards from the viewpoint of the interaction 
between METI and other ICT decision makers, and concluded that the main actors 
adjusted to policy coordination under the leadership of the IT Strategic Headquarters 
and the introduction of a policy evaluation system in 2001 [30].  
 
 
                                                 
8 Collaboration is a process in which autonomous actors interact through formal and informal negotiation, 
jointly creating rules and structures governing their relationships and ways to act or decide on the issues 
that brought them together (Thomson et al, 2009). 
9 Policy integration refers to the aligning of individual policies with overarching objectives by 
harmonizing policies or developing complementary policies that still maintain the autonomy and 
independence of the sub-policies that happen to be the components of a system (Seong & Song, 2013). 
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2.2.6 East Asian knowledge network and cooperation  
 
Differing from discussions on economic and technological aspects of digital 
content, a group of researches pay attention to international content distribution as a 
socio-cultural phenomenon. They tried interpreting as the causes and effects of content 
distribution through historical or cultural backgrounds. One theory in the early 2000s 
insisted that the popularity of Japanese or Korean popular culture (pop culture) in East 
Asia has been attributable that the region has long belonged to Confucian and Mandarin 
culture (Min, 2006). He provided a thesis that East Asian people tended to have easily 
empathized with it; people from developing countries who could feel it difficult to 
accommodate the Western culture intact, Japanese or Korean content might well have 
played a role of the buffer to relieve them from culture shock [31]. On the other hand, 
the latest researches argued the necessity of position changes from cultural “sameness.” 
Hong (2013) developed from observations on the transnational cultural consumption 
within East Asia into the discourses of identity in relation to the “otherness” based on 
the global content flow. She also pointed that it should be free from cultural industries 
discussion based on Western‐oriented discourse in order to develop universal 
communication theories [32]. 
Based on the rich literature on “Asian culture,” some scholars raised a broader and 
practical question in the relations between content distribution and regional cooperation. 
They observed that East Asian countries have rapidly intensified their economic 
interdependence through trade, and expected a similar role to content trade. Iwabuchi et 
al. (2004) analyzed the East Asian network of cultural products, and pointed out the 
reason that intra-Asian cultural traffic of pop culture produced a new model of cross-
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cultural fertilization within Asian societies, which does not merely copy Western 
counterparts [33]. Furthermore, Jin (2001) indicated culture has a great impact on the 
knowledge creation system of a nation; the fundamental differences between Western 
and East Asian Confucian societies can best be summarized by the concepts of separate 
knowing verses connected knowing [34]. Western drives for autonomy and 
independence has given rise to the dominance of division and specialization in the 
knowledge creation process. In contrast, the drive for connection and interdependence 
in East Asia resulted in its stress on the organic integration of knowledge between 
thinking and doing, among research and development (R&D) or manufacturing. 
Selected states in this research share the cultural origin, but they have clearly aware 
that did not connote “national” culture. The conflicts from these double-sided characters 
will be discussed in Chapter 7, and also find a close tie for possible collaboration from 
digital content policy in East Asia. 
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3. Overview of Content Distribution in East Asia  
 
3.1 Methods and data source 
 
Content export is an important part of East Asian trade as high value added 
business. From the late 1990s through the present, the total trade volume among 
selective economies increases rapidly, but content trade takes on a different aspect. 
Local content distributors tended to import from developed economies especially in the 
US until the 1990s. After then, however, both exchange variables changed the flow of 
content within the region. 
   This chapter aims to identify media content distribution among the six East Asian 
economies–Korea, Japan, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan10 and Singapore–during the 
period of 1997-2015. A network analysis of the content exchange is performed based on 
commodities and service trade data. These issues are addressed: What are differences 
between content and other commodities/service trade? How much Japanese and Korean 
content distribution in East Asia has changed last ten years? Who are the main 
producers and users of content? 
To examine the correlation between content trade and other industries trade, this 
research selects two countries, Japan and Korea, reviews the structure of their content 
industry. For identifying which states are main producers and consumers of content, this 
research focuses on changes in the “centers” and near the “boundaries,” and approached 
                                                 
10 For political reasons, the UN is not allowed to show trade statistics referring to Taiwan, a province of 
China, but it is included under “Other Asia, not elsewhere specified (code 490).” In principle, trade data 
for territories belonging to Asia, but not specified by country, could end up in code 490. But the only 
trade of Taiwan is currently included under this code. 
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regional networks based on trade data. For testifying those points, two hypotheses are 
postulated. 
 
H1) In the 1990s, “one-centric networks” were observed from content trade in East Asia.  
H2) In the 2000s, content trade networks in East Asia are shifting toward a non-
hierarchical “distributed” form. 
 
This research estimates the volume of trade using input-output tables among the six 
economies from 1997 to 2015. The trade data about “cultural goods” extracted from the 
UN Comtrade
11
 are classified under the Harmonised System (HS) code.  This research 
partly adapts code from UNESCO (2005, 2009) [35] and Sugiura (2008)
12
 [36], and 
adds recording media and games (HS 8523 and 950410) that can be distributed using 
electronic media as listed in Table 3.1. Design goods and tourism originally included in 
UNESCO, the advertising industry included in PwC, and art works in METI are 
excluded in this research; it is debatable whether the whole of design items, advertising, 
or arts should be defined as the content industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 UN Comtrade has around 160 reporting countries or areas, which cover more than 90% of world trade. 
Valuation is based on customs records in current USD. 
12 He selected HS codes 3705/6, 49, 8524, 97 as culture-related goods.  
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Table 3.1 Codes used for defining media content in HS, SITC13, ISIC14, JSIC15 and EBOPS 
Category HS code SITC ISIC JSIC EBOPS  
Film
16
 3706 
Cinematograph 
film 
883 
Cinematographic 
film 
591 
Motion picture, 
video and 
television program 
activities 
8011 
Cinemas 
  
  
 
 
Broadcasting  8523 
Recording 
media 
 602  
TV programming 
and broadcasting 
activities 
382  
TV 
broadcasting  
  
601 Radio 
broadcasting 
383 Cable 
broadcasting 
  
Music 8524  
Sound 
recordings  
898  
Musical 
instruments and 
sound recordings 
592 
Sound recording 
and music 
publishing 
4169 
Sound 
information 
  
Game 950410  
Video games  
89431  
Video games  
582 
Software 
publishing 
391 
Game 
software 
services 
  
Publishing 49  
Printed books, 
newspapers, 
pictures 
892  
Printed matter 
581 Publishing 
books 
414 
Publishers, 
except 
newspapers 
  
   413 
Newspaper 
publishers 
  
Cartoon/ 
Animation/ 
Character 
(49/3706)*    (416)*   
Performance     287 
Personal, 
cultural, 
and 
recreational 
services 
 
Web content   631 
Web portals  
4011  
Web portal 
providers 
 262 
Computer 
and 
information 
services 
 
Mobile 
application 
  639 
Other information 
service 
4012 
Application 
services 
providers 
  
 Note: *Cartoon is included in published books; animation is under film category. 
                                                 
13 Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) is currently arranging under the revision 4. 
14 International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) is currently arranging under the revision 4. 
15 Japan Standard Industrial Classification (JSIC) is currently arranging under the revision 13. 
16 It is defined as cinema or motion picture in some researches, and sometimes does not separated with 
broadcasting programs. 
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 This research uses several applied methods such as analysis based on import and 
value-added induced coefficients. Import series are usually perceived to have higher 
reliability than those of exports, since they serve as a reference to impose duties, quotas 
and other trade restrictions that are absent in the control of exports. However, providing 
an accurate estimation of the content flow is a challenging task. Unlike other industries, 
content includes both goods and services. For example, it is easily captured by 
commodity export that the foreign sales of a movie’s digital video disc (DVD) package. 
But the online payment for downloading games does not be categorized under the UN 
Comtrade, because content that is not stored on traditional media will be considered a 
service. In the aspect of services trade statistics, internationally comparable data were 
compiled using the International Monetary Fund (IMF) classification for EBOPS 
putting in place since 2002. The EBOPS classification provides a more extensive 
breakdown of cultural activities which was not previously available. Thus, this research 
extracted EBOPS code 262(Computer and information services) and 287(Personal, 
cultural, and recreational services) for measuring content trade as well.  
 
 
3.2 Current Japanese and Korean content markets 
 
 3.2.1 Importance of Japanese and Korean content in East Asia 
 
As Figure 3.1 shows, US, Japan, China, Germany and the United Kingdom are 
the top five countries by the scale of the global content market. There is a similarity to 
Gross Domestic (GDP) ranking, but a time lag exists. China narrowly won Germany in 
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2011 to become the third-largest content market in the world. Even though the growth 
of content market is slower than total economic growth, China has the fastest growing 
content market with Brazil.  
    
 
 
Figure 3.1 Global content market shares by country in 2013 (%) 
  
Note: based on annual sales, in million USD.  
Source: PwC. (2014). Ibid. 
 
 Japanese content market, the second-largest in the world, shares 48 percent of six 
selected economies. However, as Table 3.2 shows, its growth came into sluggish pace 
from the mid-2000s. Chinese content market increased almost 3.5 times last decade, and 
is expected to have 60,000 screens by 2016, six times more than 2011 (PwC, 2012) [3]. 
There is no doubt that China is one of the most important factors that changed the shape 
of East Asian content network. 
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Table 3.2 Size of content market in selected economies: 2003-2014 
(Unit: million USD) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Japan 105534 114789 124150 132905 195,808 200,147 193,627 195,667 192,796 198,938 204,913 210,424 
Korea 30799 33237 34721 37181 31,050 33,088 35,804 39,478 43,381 45,839 49,225 51,835 
China 34454 41044 48839 56220 63,667 73,845 75,704 88,110 102,210 114,530 130,934 147,377 
Hong 
Kong 3820 4454 5078 5830 5,728 5,969 5,777 6,452 7,013 7,500 7,965 8,504 
Taiwan 6884 7603 7901 8203 9,024 8,960 9,452 10,006 10,454 10,667 11,086 11,700 
Singapore 1912 2142 2254 2454 3,315 3,488 3,584 3,860 4,038 4,280 4,542 4,790 
  
Source: PwC. (2008, 2012, 2014). Entertainment and media outlook.  
  
Digital content market shows some differences: market size of between Korea and 
China has developed almost same until 2011 (Table 3.3). It can be assumed that the 
digital content market in Korea is more vitalized than Japan and China.  
  
Table 3.3 Size of digital content market* in Japan, Korea and China 
 (Unit: million USD) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Japan 13,894 15,555 17,733 20,195 22,302 24,647 26,965 29,304 
Korea 3,779 5,073 5,667 7,010 8,334 9,664 10,977 12,378 
China 1,499 2,303 4,159 5,436 7,058 8,529 10,358 12,227 
  
 Note: *only included online video and game, digital music, e-book and mobile application.  
 Source: Digital Vector. (2011); PwC’s Entertainment and media outlook.  
 
Compare to other economic indicators among Japan, Korea, and China, three states 
account for 20 percent of global GDP, and share 17 percent of the world trade volume.  
In this chapter, Japanese and Korean content markets are selected for reviewing the 
current content market structure and analyzing trade tendencies.  
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Table 3.4 Average exchange rate by year 
(Unit: 1 USD) 
 JPY KRW CHY 
1995 94.04 770.94 8.35 
1996 108.82 805.13 8.31 
1997 120.98 956.58 8.29 
1998 130.75 1394.97 8.28 
1999 113.8 1188.65 8.28 
2000 107.79 1131.12 8.28 
2001 121.53 1290.99 8.28 
2002 125.19 1250.65 8.28 
2003 115.89 1191.85 8.28 
2004 108.15 1144.14 8.27 
2005 110.13 1024.27 8.19 
2006 116.35 955.56 7.97 
2007 117.76 929.26 7.6 
2008 103.39 1101.88 6.95 
2009 93.57 1276.41 6.83 
2010 87.76 1156.86 6.77 
2011 79.71 1107.9 6.46 
2012 79.81 1126.87 6.31 
2013 97.62 1095.15 6.14 
2014 105.96 1052.96 6.14 
2015 121.04 1131.16 6.23 
2016 - - - 
 
Source: IMF. Data and Statistics. 
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3.2.2 Japanese content industry by sector 
 
This part is to examine the circumstances of content industry in Japan. The 
Japanese content market recorded 122 billion USD
17
 in 2013, maintaining almost same 
size since 2007 as reflected in Table 3.2. The stagnant comes from sharp decreasing of 
publishing market, the biggest share of Japanese content market (Figure 3.2), from 44 
percent in 2009 to 39 percent in 2013. In contrast, the game industry is increasing from 
eight percent in 2009 to 11 percent in 2013. 
 
Figure 3.2 Content market shares by sector in Japan: Based on sales in 2013 
 
Note: Both film and broadcasting industries are reflected under ‘video’ category. 
Source: Digital Content Association of Japan. (2014). 2014 Digital Content White Paper [37]. 
 
  
                                                 
17 This number is based on the latest Japanese statistics included in the Digital content market white paper 
(DCAJ, 2014). Comparing to PwC (2014)’s report that Japanese market as 210 billion USD, it showed 
only half of it because of lacking advertisement market. In this research, both numbers are introduced 
because it shows the government’s definition for content and its markets. 
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One of the prominent traits of Japanese content market is that composed of a strong 
leader and many followers (Nakamura, 2010) [38]. The Hirschman-Herfindahl Index 
(HII)
18
 that measures how much their market structure is concentrated, has been stable 
in most media due to regulation. There is a concern existed that a small number of firms 
controls entire market structure as well as freedom of expression. However, media 
content firms have enough scale to help investing for content technologies, and 
negotiating in a parallel position with world leading companies or the government. 
In the film industry, Toho Co., Ltd. accounts for 41 percent
19
 of the total box-office 
revenue in 2012 (Cinema times, 2013) [39]. The ratio of foreign movies to Japanese 
movies is half and half, though the market shares of imported films show an increasing 
trend for last several years. The HII of film distributors was 1400
20
 regarding relatively 
concentrated. Moreover, broadcasting satellite (BS) distributors are much more 
concentrated, as the HII recorded 4200. There are commercial channels supported by 
five flagship stations
21
 including WOWWOW, but the market shares of NHK 
overwhelm other channels. In addition, music industry that includes spending on 
recorded music and performances shares 12 percent in the total content market. Music 
distributors’ HII shows 1600, relatively concentrated, because three distributors—Sony 
(merged BMG in 2008), Universal (merged EMI in 2013), Warner—exist as dominant 
                                                 
18 HII can be calculated based on following formula.  
HII=∑ 𝑆𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1  
si is the market share of firm i in the market, and n is the number of firms 
19 Warner shares 8.8%, Sony 7.1%, Shochiku 4.2%, Kadokawa 2.8 %. 
20 HII in following range regarded as  
   0<HII<1000: competitive  
1000<HII<1800: relatively concentrated 
1800<HII: very concentrated  
HII=10000: monopoly 
21 In broadcasting, a flagship (also known as a key station) originates a television network, or a particular 
radio or television program that plays a key role in the branding of and consumer loyalty to a network or 
station. 
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powers. While growth in the service market involving music industry, the commodity 
like CDs was declined. 
Spending on non-digital music had been falling at rates averaging more than 20 
percent annually from 2006 to 2010. New streaming services and smartphone/ tablet 
penetration growth helped to expand the digital market (PwC, 2012) [3]. 
Focusing on content trade, Japanese content industry as a whole captured 2.85 
percent of global export sales in 2012. It slightly reduced to 2.83 percent in 2010, 
implying Japanese content industries were facing tough competition in export markets.  
 
 
3.2.3 Korean content industry by sector 
 
The size of Korean content market based on sales in 2012 was 55.2 billion 
USD
22
, almost a half-size of Japanese content market, representing a 5.2 percent 
increase from the previous year. There were reported that 111,587 firms existed under 
Korean content industry in the same year, however, continued reduction trend. The 
majority of them were small and medium-sized enterprises, and the HII recorded less 
than 1000 in most sectors except broadcasting business.  
 
                                                 
22 This number is based on the latest Korean government statistics (MCST & KOCCA, 2014) and 
extracted film, broadcasting, music, game, publishing, cartoon/animation and character industries only. 
Korean government officially reported their content market as 77.4 billion USD, and shown wide 
discrepancies in scales quoted for the result by PwC (2014) reporting that the volume of Korean market as 
51.8 billion USD. This gap is assumed that comes from the definition of the content industry as well as 
research methodologies. In this research, both numbers are introduced because it shows the government 
perception for content markets. 
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Figure 3.3 Content market shares by sector in Korea: Based on sales in 2012 
 
Note: Each percentage calculated based on annual sales. 
Source: MCST & KOCCA. (2014). 2013 Content Industry Statistics. 
 
Similar to Japan, the publishing industry takes the largest portion of Korean content 
market shown in Figure 3.3. However, the rapid growth of Korean content sales derives 
from the game industry. From 2005 to 2012, games market grew by nine percent 
annually, and reached to 8.6 billion USD due to the diversification of online game 
exports and the expansion of mobile game services (MCST et al., 2014) [40]. The 
market size of other sectors in the content industry has also grown last decade. Despite 
the slight decline of terrestrial and satellite broadcasting sales, revenues of cable 
television were increased. Cartoon market annually grew 18.4 percent from 2005 to 
2008 led by educational purpose content for introducing foreign language or 
mathematics (KOCCA, 2012) [41]. However, animation market is very small that only 
1.1 billion USD in 2012, even Korea’s animation firms serve as a subcontractor for 
global companies. The original animation is growing with the aid of investment funds 
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recently, and is expected to change to a high value-added industry (MCST et al., 2013) 
[42]. Character market experienced a rapid growth between 2005 and 2012 from 1.7 
billion USD to 6.7 billion USD. This figure includes original character development and 
licensing, and related goods manufacturing. The number of companies increased seven 
percent from 1,521 in 2008 to 1,992 in 2012. 
A distinct feature of current Korean content market is the interactions with ICTs. For 
example, Korean film industry shares only seven percent, but has clearly shown 
technological transfer since the mid-2000s. Firstly, home video market is shifting to 
digital; sales of packaged movie dropped sharply while video on demand (VOD) 
streaming service became prevailing. Secondly, three dimensional (3D) movies are 
increasing at the box office, and are expected to change content production patterns as 
well as home appliance market in the next decade. In addition, music market recorded 
six percent shares in sales in 2012, and digital sales overtook non-digital sales. This 
technological transformation made decreased in the number of companies to 37,116 in 
2012. The total amount of sales is increasing trend because of a constant growth in 
service exports especially profits coming from overseas Korean popular music (K-pop) 
concerts. Various CT elements including 3D holographic technology applied for making 
a K-pop concert draw attention as well as raising profits. 
The fast growing of Korean content industry mainly depends on overseas sales. The 
drift curve between content market growth and export growth is similar as a typical 
growth curve for the early stage of its development. Korean content export recorded 
2.03 percent of global export sales in 2012, and the broadcasting content export to Japan 
has driven total growth. Even though China is the largest partner for Korea in total trade 
volume, Japan shares the largest portion of broadcasting sales.  
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Figure 3.4 Korean export share of broadcasting content by partners in 2012 (%) 
 
Note: Each percentage calculated based on annual sales.  
Source: MCST & KOCCA. (2014). Ibid. 
 
 
3.3 Changing flows of content distribution in East Asia 
 
3.3.1 Japan 
 
Figure 3.5 represents a growth curve of Japanese content trade that defined as a 
commodity. It fluctuated between 1997 and 2002, but after 2003 total export of content 
commodity trade drastically increased. Since 2007 partially recovered from this trend.  
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(Million USD) 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Japanese content exports to East Asia: 1997- 2015 
 
Source: UN Comtrade; IMF database.  
  
 
Figure 3.6 shows the export of content-related commodity by partner countries. The 
most important counterpart was Singapore from 1997 to 2003. Service trade in this 
period has less increased, but more expanded because the value added ratio over 70 
percent. Especially, service export to Korea including various content services in the 
form of royalties and licensing fees. Around one thousand Japanese literary works are 
translated and published in Korea every year. Korea imports various content services 
from Japan in the form of royalties and licensing fees (MOFA, 2015) [43].  
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Figure 3.6 Japanese content exports by partner countries: 1997- 2015 
 
Source: UN Comtrade; IMF database.  
 
 
However, compared with whole trade volume and content trade, it is not found any 
strong correlation (correlation coefficient=0.42) and the low correlation coefficient was 
extract. 
 
 
3.3.2 Korea 
 
Korean commodity export sharply increased; it is a fairly typical growth curve 
as Figure 3.7 shows. Among Korean content, the game industry has been leading in the 
export performance. It shared only 5.12 percent in 2004, but growing up to 16 percent 
in 2012. Broadcasting content especially TV drama
23
 got popular in East Asia. Export of 
broadcasting content has been annually grown by 12 percent since 2005 with the 
                                                 
23 Soap operas often refer to TV drama in East Asia. 
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spreading of the Korean Wave (KOCCA, 2014) [44]. Music industry revealed an 
impressive change in its global market share from 0.98 percent in 2004 to 2.12 percent 
in 2006. This change indicates that K-pop has soared in popularity.  
 
(Million USD) 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Korean content exports to East Asia: 1997-2015 
 
Source: UN Comtrade; IMF database. 
 
It decreased in 2008 under the influence of economic crisis and lowering exchange 
rates. Jung et al. (2012) analyzed the structure change of Korean content exports from 
1995 to 2011 based on the Trade Specification Index (TSI). The TSI of gaming, 
animation, and music industry is positive over whole period. On the other hand, the TSI 
of movie, broadcasting and carton fluctuate with positive and negative, meaning they 
had not been the competitiveness of exports [45]. 
 45 
Japan is Korea’s the largest content export market. As Figure 3.8 shows, the amount 
of exports to Japan jumped from 2002. Although Japan still remains important to Korea, 
its importance has slid as it has been edged out by other trade partners. On the other 
hand, the growth of export to China arose from her economic reform. Chinese 
authorities adapted elements of market economy from the 1990s, and allowed for 
foreign media content especially for reorganizing their broadcasting system. The 
consumption patterns changed with imported content. At that time, Korean content was 
distributed timely in China, and demands for Korean content had been increasing 
steadily.  
 
(Million USD) 
 
Figure 3.8 Korean content exports by partner countries: 1997-2015 
Source: UN Comtrade; IMF database. 
 
In services trade, online game exports have been diversified and expanded to mobile 
game services. From 2005 to 2012, the game export recorded an average growth rate of 
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24 percent, and reached to 1.9 billion USD in 2008. In 2012, the game export earnings 
of 2.6 billion USD, but import were only 179 million. Content service exports 
especially profits coming from overseas concerts of Korean pop stars. 
The music market showed an 11.3 percent increase in sales, representing a constant 
growth in exports: 16.47 million USD in 2008, 31.27 million USD in 2009, 83.26 
million USD in 2010, 196.11 million USD in 2011, and 235.10 million USD in 2012. 
By partners, Korea-Japan trade has remained modestly since 2009. Export earnings 
from online games have been skyrocketing with expansion to Japan, China and Taiwan. 
Between 2003 and 2005, the volume of exports from Korea to Japan was more than the 
volume of exports to Korea from Japan, but recently has been balanced.  
 
 
 
3.3.3 Social Network Analysis 
  
After the late 1990s, complex networks were observed in East Asia that deepening 
of mutual economic interdependence within the region. Based on the imports of UN 
commodity trade statistics, network analysis software—UCINET and NetDraw—
obtained the series of network pictures. 
NetDraw is a program for drawing social networks, and analyzes the input-output 
data. It automatically determines the position, distance, and thickness of each node. 
Among options—different levels of dichotomization, effectively selecting only strong 
ties, only weak ties, this research has the option of letting the thickness of lines 
correspond to strength of ties. The program makes it read in multiple node attributes for 
use in setting colors and sizes of nodes. 
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Figure 3.9 and 3.10 demonstrate the relative position of six economies in 1998 and 
2009. In 1997, Japan was in the top tiers in content trade in the region. Figure 3.9 shows 
that Japan was the most actively exported in 1998. This figure supports the hypothesis 
that “one-centric networks” were observed from content trade in the 1990s. 
 
 
Figure 3.9 Network of content trade in East Asia: 1998
24
 
 
Use UCINET with UN Comtrade data  
Source: Borgatti, S.P., Everett, M.G. and Freeman, L.C. 2002. Ucinet for Windows: Software for 
Social Network Analysis. Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies. 
 
 
On the other hand, content export from Japan remained the import position in 2009, 
but near-term growth continued to be sluggish, offsetting increases in other countries, 
particularly China.  
 
                                                 
24 Networks is drawn based on import data, because import series are usually perceived to have higher 
reliability than those of exports, since they serve as a reference to impose duties, quotas and other trade 
restrictions that are absent in the control of exports. 
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Figure 3.10 Network of content trade in East Asia: 2009 
 
Use UCINET with UN Comtrade data  
Source: Borgatti, S.P., Everett, M.G. and Freeman, L.C. 2002. Ucinet for Windows: Software for 
Social Network Analysis. Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies. 
 
 
Japanese content trade flows have shifted decidedly towards East Asia. Hierarchy 
changes were seen in last ten years, shifting toward a non-hierarchical distributed and 
decentralized form. 
In Chapter 3.1, following two hypotheses are postulated. 
H1) In the 1990s, “one-centric networks” were observed from content trade in East Asia.  
H2) In the 2000s, content trade networks in East Asia are shifting toward a non-
hierarchical “distributed” form. 
As Figure 3.10 shows, the East Asian content trade network became far more 
decentralized and distributed in 2009 and later. In quantifying the relations among the 
six Asian economies, the dominance of Japanese content has weakened but not faster 
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than other changes in the total trade market. However, the influence of China in the 
content sphere is not stronger than its influence in other industries. 
 
 
 
3.4 Limitations of content trade  
 
This chapter analyzed the distribution of East Asian content among six states 
using trade statistics. After the late 1990s, distributed networks were observed in East 
Asia that deepening of mutual economic interdependence within the region. However, 
following limitations can be classified into three categories. 
Firstly, trade data can have measurement biases or lack of inter-temporal consistency 
(UNESCO, 2005) [9]. The globalization of content production, trade flows can occur 
among transactions from a multinational corporation to its local subsidiaries. It may 
result in underestimation of trade figures. Also, the value chain of the content 
production, trade flows can be occurred by transactions among branches of 
multinational corporations.  
Secondly, current trade data cannot reflect environmental changes from technological 
development. Media content is classified by observable physical characteristics or ways 
of distribution: film, television, radio, music, books, magazines, cartoon or games. After 
it digitalized, content can contain various industries that formerly distinct (Hoskins, 
2004). This problem should be considered the specific nature of digital products which 
are in need of statistical refinement and development of alternative measurement. For 
example, in customs statistics, goods are classified by their observable physical 
characteristics and not according to the industry of their origin, cultural value or similar 
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criteria (UNESCO, 2005) [9]. Furthermore, each national data shows substantial 
divergence in terms of interpretation and application of international standards, as well 
as in methodology, periodicity and accuracy of data. In this respect, import series are 
usually perceived to have higher reliability than those of exports, since they serve as a 
reference to impose duties, quotas and other trade restrictions that are absent in the 
control of exports. 
Finally, the flow of non-commercialized content cannot be measured by the trade 
statistics. Trade data only reflect the economic value of content, not their socio-cultural 
value. It is not possible to calculate the value of free digital content that can be 
downloaded from the Internet.  Moreover, illegal download mainly occurs in the 
dimension of the individual. The awareness of copyright infringement is weaker in East 
Asia than Europe or North America. This research supplemental uses Internet traffic 
maps to estimate digital content distribution in East Asia in Chapter 4. 
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4. ICT Development for Spreading Digital Content 
 
4.1 Methods and data source  
 
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) have been played an 
important role not only developing the quality of digital content, but also supporting its 
distribution in the cyberspace. In the period from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, the 
rapid development of ICTs had considerably modified the environment in which content 
is created, reproduced and distributed. Various kinds of ICTs were pointed as closely 
related with content development: improved hardware and software, broadband access, 
wireless networks, file sharing and online streaming systems. However, fast changing 
technologies make hard to choose proper indicators that can clearly show how ICTs 
impact on content distribution.  
Among them, the emergence of new media platforms on the Internet has referred as a 
major impact on changing systems for content delivery. The increase in the availability 
of faster and cheaper broadband access resulted in content market growth in the past 
several years. Demand for digital content has been spurred by the rapid increase of 
broadband subscribers, mobile broadband technologies and development of the 
participative web globally (OECD, 2013) [46]. 
Table 4.1 shows the change of the Internet access rate in the six selected states: Japan, 
Korea, mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. The number of the 
broadband users and the increasing Internet access rate of those states rank high in the 
world. According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the world 
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ranking of China based on the number of Internet users is the 1st, whereas Japan is the 
5th and Korea is the 16th in 2016.  
 
 
Table 4.1 Percentage of individuals using the Internet: 2003-2015 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2015* 
Japan 30.0 38.5 46.6 48.4 62.4 66.9 68.7 74.3 75.4 78.0 78.2 79.1 86.3 86.3 91.1 
Korea 44.7 56.6 59.4 65.5 72.7 73.5 78.1 78.8 81.0 81.6 83.7 83.8 84.1 84.8 89.7 
China 1.8 2.6 4.6 6.2 7.3 8.5 10.5 16.0 22.6 28.9 34.3 38.3 42.3 45.8 50.3 
Hong 
Kong 
27.8 38.7 43.1 52.2 56.4 56.9 60.8 64.8 66.7 69.4 72.0 72.2 72.9 74.2 84.9 
Taiwan 28.1 34.9 47.6 51.9 53.8 58.0 63.7 64.5 65.8 69.9 71.5 72.0 75.9 76.3 78.4 
Singapore 36.0 41.7 47.0 53.8 62.0 61.0 59.0 69.9 69.0 69.0 71.0 71.0 72.0 73.0 82.1 
Note: *the latest estimates for ITU’s key indicators in January 2017. 
 Source: ITU, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators database 2016.  
 
The availability of broadband has encouraged the development of new Internet 
activities and demand for content and applications. With this background, it can be 
easily assumed that content distribution through the Internet also expanded rapidly. In 
Japan, the number of broadband users has been increased from the late 1990s. At the 
beginning, the Internet connection via cable television network was in common, but the 
digital subscriber line (DSL) system has spread rapidly since 2002 (Sugaya, 2005) [47]. 
In contrast, broadband service in Korea launched a DSL business in the early stage of 
Internet development. After the ADSL development, it was quickly commercialized 
when it started the service in 1999 (Kim, 2005) [48]. In 2004, 98% of the household 
with an Internet connection is the broadband users in Korea. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3.4, current trade statistics data are impracticable for 
measuring the volume or economic value of digital content that is streaming or 
downloading on the Internet. In order to overcome the limitations of trade data, this 
chapter adopts different approaches to the analysis—Internet traffic between selected 
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states. TeleGeography
25’s global Internet bandwidth data was selected as the main index 
that can show the trend of cross-border digital content distribution. They are based on 
the research to major Internet providers operating international Internet links, routers or 
switches directly connected across borders, but do not include statistics from all of the 
international Internet operators in the world. To compensate for the incomplete dataset, 
TeleGeography developed estimates using proxies on backbone deployment and 
capacity utilization trends, including the carrier type and route type. These links 
comprise the public Internet, which carries general Internet traffic including emails, web 
pages, streaming audio and video, voice-over-IP (VoIP) calls, and corporate IP VPN 
traffic (Telegeograpy, 2013) [7]. Global Internet bandwidth data give a description of 
Internet bandwidth available between regions, countries and cities. Even though Internet 
traffic travels in both directions on international routes, TeleGeography collects the 
bidirectional averages of both average and peak (is measured at the 95%) traffic 
throughout April of each year. Average traffic is the sum of all traffic across a link 
divided by the number of seconds in the month.  
 
 
4.2 Findings  
 
Global consumer Internet traffic is set to double between 2005 and 2008 even 
under the economic regression or political tensions still existing within East Asia 
(Telegeography, 2009) [8]. Table 4.1 shows global Internet traffic for the 71 countries, 
and a large part of international Internet connections from or to the US. The 1990s and 
                                                 
25 TeleGeography, a private telecommunications market research firm, conducts in-depth research about 
international Internet networks, undersea cables, retail mobile, broadband, and fixed-line service. It 
provides a subscription-based database titled “Global Internet Geography” and shows Internet statistics 
for over seventies economies about international Internet capacity and traffic. 
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early 2000s, looking at the development status of Japan and Korea’s overseas backbone, 
it has been promoted mainly in the North America line. Backbone demand is basically 
determined according to the degree of activation of the content distribution and its 
partners. Therefore, it indicates that Japan and Korea have been developed in strong ties 
with the United States in the socio-economic, are deeply connected to the economic 
activity of the current also North America. 
 
Table 4.2 Global Internet Bandwidth by States 
 
 
 
Source: Elaboration of data by TeleGeography 
 
The Internet around the world has been developed mainly through the US, and the 
US has been in charge of the function as a hub in the global Internet network. Internet 
communication linked and added through the conversion from the US was about 94 
 55 
percent of the inter-regional traffic in 2005; other countries also built a path that 
backbone through the Britain. 
Therefore, Internet traffic between Korea and the US or Japan and the US, reflects 
not only the traffic to the US, is also included approximately equivalent traffic destined 
to other countries. In fact, Japan and Korea destined for the area of Europe or Asia, it is 
intended to be transferred to the US. When building an additional Internet 
communication network (backbone) to the US, it is necessary to predict the demand 
should be considered content distribution not only to the US, also taking into account to 
other countries via the US.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Japanese Internet bandwidth to selected countries 
Source: TeleGeography  
 
However, this situation has been gradually changed; especially Japan started to build 
direct networks to East Asian countries from the early 2000s. As Figure 4.1 shows, it 
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makes higher relevance to the scale of economic and social interaction to the content 
distribution that can be assumed through the amount of Internet traffic. As the result, 
Japanese Internet traffic to the US has still increasing, but the increase rate has been 
slowed. The degree of dependent to the US has also been relatively changed. 
Strengthening of Internet access to East Asian states is believed that is closer socio-
economic activity in this region. Japan has been enhanced content distribution to China, 
so the Internet traffic with China has increased. Internet traffic to China slightly 
different with trade data, grew from the late 2000s. From 2004 to 2009, the investment 
for backbone network between Japan and China grew almost 300 percent, but still a 
small line capacity itself in comparison with other countries showed overwhelmingly 
high growth. Bandwidth is to increase depending on the actual increase in expected 
demand, so content distribution between Japan and China was predicted to be increased 
significantly. In the late 2000s, it continued to scale the growth of content exchange in 
Japan, China, and Korea; a variety of also increasing economic activity using the 
Internet, acceleration with the Internet traffic demand. 
In addition, 2004 to 2011, it is noticeably increased to Southeast Asian countries, 
including the Philippines and Thailand. Existing traffic scale is small, the absolute 
Internet traffic itself not yet only 60 percent of the US, but the growth rate is high.   
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Figure 4.2 Korean Internet bandwidth to selected countries 
Source: TeleGeography 
 
Figure 4.2 shows, Korean Internet bandwidth to selected countries. Focusing on the 
average share of Internet traffic of Japan and Korea, 58 percent to North America, but 
42 percent is to Asia. In Asia, there is a growing fact of traffic share than the bandwidth 
share. Conversely, the share of large North American traffic is lower than the share of 
the bandwidth. This tendency is different utilization and overall average traffic volume. 
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Figure 4.3 International Internet Routes in East Asia 
Source: Asia Telecommunications Traffic Flows, 2012  http://www.telegeography.com/map 
 
Figure 4.3 presents a map that defines centers and boundaries based on 
TeleGeography’s Internet routes in East Asia. Inferring from Figure 4.1 and 4.2, Japan, 
China (including Hong Kong), and Singapore are to be at the hubs of the region. Unlike 
network analysis based on trade statistics as Figure 3.10 shows, Korea has a smaller 
node than Taiwan; Japan has close ties with Southeast Asian states as well as the six 
selected countries. In contrasting trade data and Internet traffic, it was found that Japan 
is still dominant in Internet traffic flow within East Asia. 
 59 
The development of the Internet removed the market dominance of traditional mass 
media. The development of ICTs forced the content industry to utilize digital 
technologies for its production and distribution, and this led to the current boom in 
digital content distribution in East Asia. In the traffic of the multimedia data such as 
high-quality video and music have increased rapidly, problems related to insufficient 
capacity and structure of the Internet backbone network has been pointed out. In 
particular, recent years, where the Internet traffic to the spread of mobile devices is 
rapidly increasing (TeleGeography, 2014) [7]. The growing and occupies the largest 
percentage of the video traffic. From the 2000s, various mobile devices make possible 
that video traffic is increasing rapidly. The bandwidth of 2012 of the world of the 
Internet has reached the 77Tbps, the increase in Internet traffic over the same period, an 
increase of 40 percent year-on-year. If the Internet traffic demand is not widespread 
enough fiber in the region that is expected to increase sharply is a need for new 
construction, in this case, it is to be noted that costs and time a lot. 
 
 
4.3 Implications of Internet traffic data 
 
The increasing of total content distribution is caused decisively by the rapidly 
increasing demands in East Asia for new media content, which may well be attributable 
to the revolutionary development of the fixed/mobile telecommunication and 
broadcasting technologies. From 1997 to 2008, the rapid development of Internet 
broadband has considerably modified the environment in which digital content is 
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created, reproduced and distributed. From the late 2000s, global digital content 
platforms
26
 have been developed and users are also increased.  
ICTs offer the potential for a less expensive distribution model that can result in 
significant savings in manufacturing, shipping, and inventory management. The film, 
music, and publishing industries have introduced online and electronic distribution of 
content. There is a positive feedback cycle between ICTs infrastructure and content. In 
the case of Korean Wave, there was the first boom in the early 2000s that based on 
broadcasting content distributed through foreign television station. The second Korean 
Wave in the late 2000s, however, only can be described through technological variables 
especially global Internet platforms like Facebook or YouTube. As changing the 
distribution channel to social networking service (SNS), content was consumed in a 
relatively short period of time like K-pop music video than the broadcasting content. In 
an early stage, content producers used Internet as increasing marketing effect, or PR in 
the foreign market. These days, revenue through global platforms has increased: only 
insert an advertisement banner on the video, a video distributor and SNS side can share 
incomes from advertising. 
ICTs have influenced not only by the quality of digital content, but in developing an 
emotional part including fan club culture. For example, Japanese pop culture 
communities in Korea were expanded even when the import was officially banned in 
the 1990s. Korean audiences could get involved J-pop music forming small fan 
communities through the Internet, and even members of the closed J-pop communities 
were considered fashionable (Jung, 2007) [49].  Also, fan clubs utilize the characteristics 
                                                 
26 The number YouTube and Facebook subscribers reached 800 million in 2012, and the number of 
Apple iTunes account (credit card registration only) was 200 million units, the number of Android users 
was 190 million in 2012. 
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of interaction of the Internet, and content is spontaneously spread among the inmates to 
engage with SNS use. Sharing impressions through the Internet-based fan clubs is not 
limited to the border of originated country, but fans from various countries 
spontaneously evaluate the broadcasting content. Details will be discussed using the 
example of streaming services in Chapter 6. 
In sum, the boundaries between media and telecommunication industries are blurring 
and new digital intermediaries and hosting platforms have emerged. Proper policies will 
require ongoing analysis of the broader impact of distribution of digital content on value 
chains. 
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5. Digital Content Policies in Japan and Korea 
 
5.1 Methods and data sources  
 
As Chapter 3 shows, the last decade was a critical transition period for the 
content market in East Asia. Sales of Japanese content progressed in the 1970s and 
1980s, taking a leading position globally after the 1990s. In the 2000s, sales of Korean 
digital content grew rapidly—especially in China—mostly from online games and 
broadcasting content. The evolution of content policy in Korea has seen a continuous 
increase in terms of government budget and support programs in this period. 
Nevertheless, it is not certain that the policies have affected the competitiveness of the 
content industry in practice. In this respect, this chapter identifies and evaluates digital 
content policies in Japan and Korea. 
These questions are addressed: Which ministries or governmental agencies in Japan 
and Korea carried out digital content policies? How and why policies have been 
changed last ten years? And what kinds of policy competition and coordination 
occurred at each stage of technological development?  
This chapter adapts the concept of policy competition and coordination as policy 
outcomes evaluation. Inter-ministerial coordination can explain activities that attempt to 
resolve policy conflicts or overlaps through negotiation or compromise. Under Seong et 
al.’s (2013) [50] typology, policy coordination or cooperation indicate one-time event 
with no guarantee that the relevant policies are developed in the same direction in the 
future, but in this research, it is used in a broader sense that includes all cooperative 
interactions among ministries. 
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Ministries and agencies’ competition and coordination can be seen through 
establishing or amending related laws, organizations and programs. This chapter 
examines whether structural holes existed by drawing networks among digital content 
promotion laws and affiliated governmental agencies using comparative research 
methods to the decision making process for digital content technology development in 
Japan and Korea.  
It identifies the historical background and specific examples of content policy 
making process both countries by analyzing their governmental organizations and major 
laws in 5.2 and 5.3. Then it seeks to examine policy competitions and coordination in 
5.4, and discusses the efficiency of digital content. With the comparative analysis with 
Japan and Korea, this chapter introduces examples of structural holes as well as policy 
competition and coordination occurring at specific stages of technological development. 
These arguments are supported by documentation from the 1990s, official 
government publications, newspapers/periodicals, and journals mainly come from Japan 
and Korea. At the same time, semi-structured interviews with relevant policymakers and 
experts from private sectors provide a crosscheck on internal validity. Considering 
annual sales and characteristics of major products, six Japanese firms and seven Korean 
firms were selected. These companies show differences in their management style, but 
they have common attributes in revenue structure and global business strategy. A total of 
forty discussants were agreed to be interviewed, and the interviews were conducted 
between December 2011 and December 2013. The basic information about interviewees 
is listed in Table 5.1 and the pre-survey questionnaire is attached in the appendix.  
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Table 5.1 Basic information about interviewees 
 
Affiliation Date Number of 
interviewed 
person 
Sector 
METI Feb. 2012 2  Public 
MIC Dec. 2011 2  Public 
Information and Communications Policy  
under MIC May 2013 2  Public 
MOFA in Japan June 2012 3  Public 
Japan Foundation June 2012 2  Public 
NHK April 2012 2  Broadcasting 
Fuji TV June 2012 2  Broadcasting 
NTV Dec. 2011 2  Broadcasting 
Yahoo Japan Jan. 2013 2  Web content 
Kadokawa Jan. 2013 1  Film 
KDDI  May 2013 1  Platform 
 
MCST Dec. 2013 2  Public 
KOCCA Jan. 2013 2  Public 
MSIP Dec. 2013 1  Public 
MOFA in Korea Dec. 2013 3  Public 
KBS Jan. 2013 1  Broadcasting 
SBS Jan. 2013 1  Broadcasting 
SM Entertainment Jan. 2013 2  Music 
Naver  Jan. 2013 1  Web content 
Korea Telecom Dec. 2013 2  Platform 
SK Telecom Dec. 2013 3  Platform 
NEXON Dec. 2013 1  Game 
 
 
5.2 Japanese government organizations for digital content policies 
 
5.2.1 Historical Background 
In Japan, the development of content industry was left to private sectors until the 
late 1990s. This shows a sharp contrast with the Japanese “cultural policy” promoting 
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culture, tradition, language or art (Otmazgin, 2012) [51]. Pop culture, movies, music, 
animation, and games—categorized as the entertainment industry—were regarded as 
being relatively unimportant compared to traditional culture (JETRO, 2005) [52]. 
Instead, the actual initiatives for developing content technology were led by private 
enterprises (Yoshimoto, 2003) [53]. On the other hand, ICT infrastructure was regarded 
as a key industry at the state level. It was esteemed that the comprehensive usage of 
ICTs would become extremely important for enhancing future growth, and carried 
forward plans as “technology policy.” 
Moreover, the Japanese government aspired to translate its leading position in the 
economy into cultural influence, to become so-called “soft power” of East Asia in the 
late 1990s. The term caught the attention of Japanese politicians, media, and scholars 
when it was first introduced into the global discourse. The Japanese fascination with 
soft power sprang from the challenges that Japan faced in exploring its international 
status, and the constitutional limitations placed on its use of hard power (Lee and 
Melissen, 2011). The appeal of the term was further enhanced by Nye’s (2004) 
description of Japan, a country seen its cultural influence expand since the 1990s even 
as its economic power declined [55]. The concept of soft power has been frequently and 
conveniently employed in Japanese ministries, especially at METI, MEXT and MOFA
27
, 
with politicians using the term in policy platforms regardless of their political stances
28
. 
                                                 
27 MOFA introduced the concept of soft power in Diplomatic Bluebook 2005 and noted that Japan has the 
potential to become a leader for soft power based on the popularity of its pop culture. This perception 
comes from the limitations of conventional diplomacy are being supplemented by “public diplomacy.” It 
also called “cultural diplomacy,” or “soft-power diplomacy” and reaches out directly to public opinion 
from foreigners through cultural exchange. 
 
28 The Cool Japan Strategy promoting Japanese soft power launched in 2010 under the regime of the 
Democratic Party of Japan. In addition, the Liberal Democratic Party (Jiminto) manifesto that was run up 
to the House of Representatives election in August 2009 can be said to be an example of a policy proposal 
described as a proactive foreign strategy, featuring plans to strengthen Japan’s soft power through 
intellectual exchanges in science and technology. 
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METI officially recognized the importance of the digital content industry to the 
Japanese economy in 2002. In the face of a declining domestic market, the government 
has gone further than any other to encourage the consumption of Japanese goods abroad 
to help drive growth. A new category called “the information and telecommunications 
industry”—a concept that encompasses Internet-based services and businesses that 
produce video, audio, and text content—was added to its industry classification table for 
international comparisons as included in Table 3.1. While it did not have a clear 
definition of digital content industry, policies developing its technology existed in 
various forms including specialized programs and organizations. 
 
5.2.2 Legal framework 
According to the legal search system of Japanese e-government, there exist 
more than ten different laws associated with content technologies or industries. As 
shown in Table 5.2, they are fewer in number than similar laws in Korea and half of the 
Japanese laws have been in place for more than fifty years. This implies that the 
Japanese legal environment for content is stable and less influenced by political regime 
changes. Some interviewees pointed out that the rigidity of the Japanese legal system 
could not catch up to the speed of ICT development. For example, specific types of 
Internet protocol television (IPTV) are not regarded as broadcasting under Article 126 
(1) of the Broadcast Act and are treated as “automatic public transmission29” under the 
Copyright Act. 
                                                 
29 This means, it is a form of public transmission occurring automatically in response to a request from 
the public, excluding public transmissions falling within the term “broadcast” or “wire-broadcast.” 
(Copyright Act, Article 2 (1)). 
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The ratio of regulatory versus promotion laws is almost half and half. Similarly, in 
Korea, there is overlapped jurisdiction between its Copyright Act and Intellectual 
Property Basic Act. Compared to the regulatory role of the Copyright Act, the 
Intellectual Property Basic Act was established for promoting intangible assets, 
especially technologies, as a core portion of the industrial foundation. 
 
Table 5.2 Japanese laws relating to content 
Title Enforcement 
Date 
Competent  
Authorities 
Purpose 
Broadcast Act 1950 MIC Regulation 
Radio Act 1950 MIC Regulation 
Copyright Act 1970 MEXT Regulation 
Act on Prohibition of Unauthorized Computer Access 1999 MIC Regulation 
Basic Act on the Formation of an Advanced 
Information and Telecommunications Network 
Society 
2000 the Cabinet Promotion 
Basic Act on Promotion of Culture and the Arts 2001 MEXT Promotion 
Act on Promotion of Development of Combined 
Telecommunications and Broadcasting Technologies 
2001 MIC Promotion 
Intellectual Property Basic Act 2002 the Cabinet Promotion 
Act on the Protection of Personal Information 2003 the Cabinet 
 
Regulation 
Act on Promotion of Creation, Protection and 
Exploitation of Contents 
2004 MIC Promotion 
 
Source: Modified by the author using data from Japanese Legal data System http://law.e-gov.go.jp 
Ministry of Justice, Japanese Law Translation Database System  
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp 
 
While the Japanese legal system for digital content development is regarded as 
leaning towards conservative, there was a breakthrough with the Act on Promotion of 
Creation, Protection and Exploitation of Contents enacted in 2004. Under this act, 
producers are given ownership of content order by the government in projects with 
entertainment or educational purposes. It is often referred to as the Japanese version of 
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the Bayh-Dole Act
30
, but went further in that it attempted to give ownership to content 
producers for the first time in the world. 
The final trait of Japanese legal framework for content technologies and industries is 
that it is less dependent on written laws. In spite of progressing METI’s roles in digital 
content policies, it is not responsible for the major acts listed above. According to the 
interview, METI intends to pursue content policies as its own projects rather than 
through institutions because it can be operated more flexibly. 
 
5.2.3 Major actors of digital content policies 
5.2.3.1 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
Since the late 1990s, METI has targeted the content industry as a leading 
industry for future economic growth. METI drafted its own policy document 
contributing to the acceleration of content development, specifying as the main goal the 
promotion of Japanese media content overseas, dubbing this push the Japan revived 
Strategy. This document is significant in that it is the first to offer a concrete action plan 
for pursuing the government’s ambitious digital growth agenda. 
In 2003, METI raised an important question concerning the structural and 
technological problems in the Japanese content industry: the distributors’ oligopoly and 
immature broadband infrastructure. The oligopoly among content distributors could 
worsen content producers’ dependency. The relations between content and broadband 
were much more reciprocal, so the lack of content would threaten broadband 
                                                 
30 The Bayh-Dole Act or Patent and Trademark Law Act Amendments of 1980 is US legislation dealing 
with intellectual property among federal agencies that fund research, enabling small businesses and non-
profit organizations, including universities, to retain title to “inventions” made under federally-funded 
research programs. 
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development. As a solution to the two problems, METI ensured fair competition by 
revising anti-monopoly guidelines and establishing model contracts, creating an 
environment that facilitated financing, and developing human resources. It showed that 
METI held a higher priority for improving industrial conditions than for promoting 
content technology itself.  
 
Figure 5.1 Sub-organizations of the METI involving digital content 
 
Source: Modified by the author using data from the METI Official website 
 http://www.meti.go.jp/english/aboutmeti/profiles/aMETIlist01e.html 
 
The organization of METI in Figure 5.1 also shows an incline towards industrial 
aspects. The Commerce and Information Policy Bureau and its Creative Industries 
Division and Media and Content Industry Division are authorized to push ahead digital 
content development. The Creative Industries Division was originally established as the 
Creative Industries Promotion Office, so-called Cool Japan office, under the 
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Manufacturing Industries Bureau in June 2010. The upper tier authorities’ change from 
“manufacturing” to “commerce” can be read Japanese government’s intention of 
promoting sales of content rather than intervene in its production technology. 
From the interview, it was indicated that a support scheme for content technology was 
hardly founded in METI. The Industrial Science and Technology Policy and 
Environment Bureau partly intervenes the standardization process of content technology, 
but does not have the initiative for technological development of digital content. Instead, 
METI planned to eradicate piracy for expanding overseas sales through establishing 
copyright protection technology. 
 
5.2.3.2 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication  
MIC was established in 2001 that combined the administrative management 
sector, the pension sector, as well as the ICTs sector. Compared to how in the 
converged network of METI, the Commerce and Information Policy Bureau is located 
in the center and the Global ICT Strategy Bureau, the Information and Communications 
Bureau and the Telecommunications Bureau of MIC are in balance and share policy 
linkage with digital content issues. 
As in Figure 5.2, the Information and Communications Bureau encourages the 
development of content technology, but interviewees pointed out that the bureau mainly 
focused on terrestrial broadcasting and less involved in the online distribution. In the 
aspect of IPR, it keenly monitors copyright violation by conventional media rather than 
cyber piracy, even though the secondary usage of existing content has become a 
common phenomenon in East Asia. The Internet has particular interactive features that 
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other conventional media do not have, and new media content has already begun to 
develop. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Sub-organizations of the MIC involving digital content 
 
Source: Modified by the author using data from the MIC Official website  
http://www.soumu.go.jp/english/soumu/io.html 
In response to technological changes, MIC (2009) announced that it would create 
systems for the efficient handling of IPR by enabling centralized management of 
information relating to copyright holders and the scope of licenses concerned, as well as 
access by businesses to distribute content overseas. It prevents through drastic measures 
the unauthorized distribution of content, including the development of systems that 
monitor unauthorized distribution or provide warnings (MIC, 2012). In addition, MIC 
has been holding a Study Group on Measures for Promotion of Circulation of Broadcast 
Content for the purpose of deliberating on assurance of opportunities for transmitting 
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content in other countries, improvement in efficiency of IPR processing, and other 
specific measures toward the development of new markets since November 2012 (MIC, 
2013b).These efforts are closer to the regulatory role than promotion, but recently the 
Promotion for Content Distribution Division has concerned itself with broadcasters 
actively making efforts for creating new content markets such as overseas expansion 
through international broadcasting and sales of programs and distribution of content. 
 5.2.3.3 Prime Minister and his Cabinet
31
 
One of the important trends in the digital content policy of Japan is coordination 
by a higher-level agency. The Cabinet of Japan, the executive branch of the government, 
consisting of the Prime Minister and fourteen ministers, is interested in promoting the 
digital content industry and puts particular effort into strengthening a proper IPR 
management system since the late 1990s. When Prime Minister Koizumi started IPR 
reform in the early 2000s and the Cabinet accelerated the speed of these reforms, the 
IPR system managed to cross political party lines. The IT Strategic Headquarters and 
the Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters
32
 were established under the Prime 
Minister’s office in 2000 and 2003, and all of the former Prime Ministers have held 
meetings for discussing the formulation of the Strategic Program for a decade. In 2012, 
the Minister in charge of the Cool Japan strategy
33
 was newly appointed, and it can be 
                                                 
31 This part includes explanations of the Prime Minister's office (Kantei), the Cabinet Office and the 
Cabinet Secretariat headed by the Chief Cabinet Secretary. They organize the Cabinet's public relations, 
coordinate ministries and agencies, collect intelligence for the government and organize miscellaneous 
tasks.  
32 It was officially translated as the Strategic Council on Intellectual Property until 2004.  
   http://japan.kantei.go.jp/policy/titeki/index_e.html 
33 The role for the Minister in charge of the “Cool Japan” Strategy is a concurrent position that of the Minister 
of State for Regulatory Reform. Under the second Abe administration, Inada Tomomi holds the position of the 
Minister in charge of Administrative Reform, the Minister in charge of Civil Service Reform and the Minister 
in charge of “Challenge Again” Initiative. 
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called one of the most prominent instances of Japan setting up a top-down process 
within the government for content development. 
Their interests are weighted towards the protection of content producers’ IPR. In July 
2003, a plan was formulated to promote the creation, protection, and use of intellectual 
property. The plan contained policies aiming to drastically expand the content business 
by enhancing the creative environment and intellectual property protection system. The 
report, published by a special panel for supporting the content industry in 2004, 
contained proposals to create a task force subtitled “National Strategy for an Age of Soft 
Power.” In a package of 270 policy measures, it cited expansion of the content industry 
as a policy priority for turning Japan into an intellectual property superpower. Even 
after the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, digital content was selected as a strategic 
industry to help the Japanese economy recover and rebuild the national image. Prime 
Minister Noda asked the Cabinet Office and related ministries to work to regain their 
vitality through the utilization of intellectual properties (Intellectual Property Strategy 
Headquarters, 2012). 
 
5.3 Korean government organizations for digital content policies 
 
5.3.1 Historical Background  
 
It is said that Korean content policy having all three features as cultural, 
technology and industrial policies, started emerging in the late 1990s. Especially, 
policies for promoting content industry contrasted markedly with regulations to pop 
culture in the 1970s and 1980s.  
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Since the liberation of 1945, the recovery of cultural identity by removing the legacy 
of Japanese colonialism has been an essential part of Korean cultural policy (Yim, 
2002.) During eighteen year (1961–1979) President Park Chung-hee’s regime, which 
placed priority on economic growth, Korean cultural policy worked as nationalistic and 
proactive way. In 1973, the first five-year master plan for cultural development was 
published and implemented during the period 1974–1979, which was the first 
comprehensive long-term plan for promoting Korean culture. The major object of this 
plan was to establish a new cultural identity by highlighting Korean cultural tradition 
(Ministry of Culture and Information, 1973), so 70 percent of the public expenditure on 
the cultural sector was invested in folk arts and traditional culture (Ministry of Culture 
and Information, 1979).  
Fostering content “industry” is based on the economic value of it (Yim, 2002). 
President Kim Dae-jung, has enhanced content industries with the purpose of improving 
the international competitiveness since the end of the 1990s, and pop culture finally 
regarded as the significant source of content industry. The significant political change 
has a massive impact on the content industry as well. 
There were two important factors for emerging Korean digital content in the late 
1990s. First, the Ministry of Information and Communication inaugurated in 1994 
according to revised Government Organization Act for the information society. It 
contributed to establish ICT infrastructure and provided access to faster and cheaper 
broadband that led to various opportunities for creating, storing, and distributing digital 
content for individuals or small-size firms. 
Second, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 triggered a rapid decline in economic 
conditions in Korea. In order to recover from the crisis, the Korean government 
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promptly responded to call for change in its foreign policies that had previously 
regulated imports in order to protect the domestic market. Korea had to change its 
foreign trading policies to restore their economy which had involved regulating foreign 
imports in order to protect the domestic economic markets and to open its doors ever 
more widely to foreign economic forces including Japan. The new open door policy 
started as a part of monetary or trade policy, but spread to cultural exchange. In October 
1998, President Kim Dae-jung visited Japan and agreed to the joint declaration on the 
New Korea-Japan partnership for the 21 century with Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi 
(The Korea Times, 8 October 1998). Since then, Korean government emphasized 
cultural exchanges with foreign countries as a way of globalization. 
Korea’s nationalistic antagonism towards Japan has mostly been a response to the 
colonial annexation by Japan. Despite their close economic relationship since 1965, 
their conflicting historic and political relations have continued. From 1978 to 1998, the 
Korean government officially prohibited direct import of Japanese content without few 
exceptions. However, a lot of Japanese content brought into Korea illegally and 
influenced Korean pop culture (Jung, 2007) [49]. 
There was a fear in Korea that the Japanese content industry, with their substantial 
capital and technology, could threaten the domestic market share of Korean content 
industries (Yim, 2002) [56]. In the late 1990s, the Korean government gradually lifted it 
sanctions against Japanese popular culture in Korean media market. Since October 1998, 
the schedule of the open door policy toward Japan was often renegotiated by Korea in 
response to lingering anti-Japanese sentiment as well as a fear of being dominated in its 
own domestic content market. As Table 5.3 describes, in 1998, Korean government 
permitted to import only a few selected Japanese films, videos, and cartoons. It limited 
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to award-winning films from the four major international festivals
34
 or jointly produced 
films with Korean directors or actors. Next year, 1999, more films and indoor popular 
music concerts (maximum 2000 audiences), and some publications were accepted. In 
2000, the wide range of films, animation, video, computer games started to import but 
still some broadcasting content are limitedly distributed. Finally, the sale of Japanese 
popular music CDs became possible in 2004.  
 
Table 5.3 Process of the Korean open door policy toward Japanese content 
 
Year Stage 
1998 - Two countries agreed to the joint declaration: New Korea-Japan Partnership 
for the 21 Century 
- Korea permitted to import Japanese awarded films, videos, and cartoons 
1999 - Permitted more films, indoor pop music concerts, and some publications 
2000 - Widely opened to films, animation, video, computer games, and limited 
broadcasting content (sports, documentary, news programs   
- Permitted both in and outdoor music concerts, and instrumental versions of 
Japanese popular music (J-pop) record import 
2004 - Allowed J-pop record with vocals 
Present - TV programs and some animation films are still banned 
- In  2011, the MCST consider lifting the ban in the near future; a single 
Japanese song was broadcast in Korea as a trial program 
 
Source: Ministry of Culture and Tourism in Korea. (Various years). 
 
Adversely with common concerns of Korean people, Korean content after the open 
door policy to Japan remarkably improved its artistic technique and diversity, allowing 
for continued production of globally competitive content. Some Korean content 
producers tried imitating Japanese content before the open door policy; this piracy could 
not be punished. However, after the open door policy to Japan, producers should find a 
                                                 
34 Cannes Film Festival, Berlin International Film Festival, Venice Film Festival, and US 
Academy Awards 
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way out from improving their technological aspect and diversified subjects allowing to 
produce globally competitive content. 
The success of Korean content—particularly TV dramas35, games, and music—came 
to be dubbed the Korean Wave, with the digitalized content industry enjoying 
international success in the 2000s. Stimulated by this success, the Ministry of 
Information and Communication (MCST) and even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (MOFAT) joined to build strategies for promoting the Korean content industry 
for the overseas market. 
In line with a political regime change by President Lee Myung-bak in 2008,
36
 the 
Government Organization Act was revised and the function of the Ministry of 
Information and Communication was dispersed among the Korea Communication 
Commission (KCC), the Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE), and MCST. There 
have been criticisms of there being an absence of a control tower since the Ministry of 
Information and Communication was dissolved. Two practical alternatives were 
attempted: the restructuring of the Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA) in 2009 
and the establishment of the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning (MSIP) in 
2013. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 Soap operas are often referred as TV drama in East Asia. 
36 The largest government reorganization since the founding of the Republic of Korea occurred when the 
conservatives came back into power with the election of Lee Myung-bak in 2008 (Kim et al, 2007). The 
government shrank to fifteen ministries from the eighteen under the previous President Roh Moo-hyun’s 
liberal government. 
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5.3.2 Legal framework  
 
During the period of the Korean military government (1962-1992), the 
authoritarian regime used media to project its aims and goals onto the public as a part of 
keeping Korean society in line with its vision. Media were monitored and controlled, 
and sometimes the government imposed temporary extralegal regulations (Kim, 2011) 
[57]. In the 1990s, the regulatory paradigm shifted with political democratization 
towards supportive ways, but protective regulation still existed until the late 1990s. 
 As Table 5.4 shows, more than twenty acts in Korea are currently involved in media or 
digital content. Half of those acts were established or amended within a period of ten 
years. Even if it was not listed below, around ten acts including the Import and 
Distribution of Foreign Publications Act were rescinded in the early 2000s. It reflects 
how the purpose of the major acts shifted emphasis from regulation to promotion.  
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Table 5.4 Korean laws relating to content 
Title Enforcement 
Date 
Competent Authorities Purpose 
Copyright Act 1957 MCST  Copyright Policy Division Regulation 
Framework Act on  
Intellectual Property 
2011 MSIP  Creative Economy 
Foundation  
 Division 
Promotion 
Public Performance Act 1961 MCST  Performing Arts & 
Traditional  
 Arts Division 
Regulation 
Publishing Industry 
Promotion Act 
2008 MCST  Publication & Printing  
 Division 
Promotion 
Framework Act on 
Video Industry 
Promotion 
1995 MCST  Film & Video Content  
 Industry Division Promotion 
Motion Pictures and 
Video Products 
Promotion Act 
2006 MCST  Film & Video Content  
 Industry Division Promotion 
Music Industry  
Promotion Act  
2006 MCST  Film & Video Content  
 Industry Division 
Regulation/Promotion 
Game Industry  
Promotion Act 
2006 MCST  Game Content Industry  
 Division 
Regulation/Promotion 
Content Industry  
Promotion Act 
2010 MCST  Digital Content Division 
Promotion 
Software Industry  
Promotion Act 
2000 MSIP  Software Policy Division 
Promotion 
Framework Act on 
Cultural Industry 
Promotion 
1999 MCST  Cultural Industry Policy  
 Division Promotion 
Framework Act on 
Culture 
2014 MCST  Regulation Reform &  
 Legal Affairs Officer 
Promotion 
Popular Culture Industry 
Development Act 
2014 MCST  Popular Culture Industry  
 Division 
Promotion 
Broadcasting Act 1987 KCC  Broadcasting Policy 
Planning Division 
Regulation 
Internet Multimedia 
Broadcasting Business 
Act 
2008 MSIP  New Media Policy 
Division Promotion 
Framework Act on 
Broadcasting and 
Telecommunication 
Development 
2010 MSIP  Policy Coordination 
Division 
Regulation/Promotion 
Framework Act on  
National Informatization 
2010 MSIP  IT Strategy Planning 
Division 
Promotion 
Framework Act on  
Telecommunications 
1984 MSIP  Policy Coordination 
Division 
Regulation 
Telecommunications 
Business Act 
1991 MSIP  Telecommunications 
Policy Planning Division 
Regulation 
 
Source: Modified by the author using data from Korea Ministry of Government Legislation  
http://www.law.go.kr 
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Some of them—the Copyright Act/Framework Act on Intellectual Property, or the 
Game Industry Promotion Act/the Content Industry Promotion Act/ the Software 
Industry Promotion Act—did not have clear boundaries and sometimes caused overlaps 
in the jurisdiction. This phenomenon might have been inevitable in the era of digital 
convergence, but a clear need emerged for monitoring and adjustment following 
technological development. 
For one thing, overlaps would occur from frequent changes of governmental 
organization. In particular, the dissolution of the Ministry of Information and 
Communication transferred content policies to MCST and the Online Digital Contents 
Industry Development Act in 2008. MCST was fully revised along with changing its 
name to Content Industry Promotion Act in 2010. The revision made unclear that the 
role of subordinating specific laws including the Game Industry Promotion Act, the 
Music Industry Promotion Act and Motion Pictures, and the Video Products Promotion 
Act. Moreover, MSIP succeeded the Ministry of Information and Communication in 
2013, and currently takes on the management of software content business mainly 
distributed through the Internet under the Software Industry Promotion Act. It decreed 
that multimedia or game content excluding cultural traits should be under the control of 
MSIP. On the other hand, MCST points out that the trend of “one-source multi-use” 
makes it hard to split content industry regulation. 
Another trait of the legal system related to digital content is the existence of the 
framework acts
37
 that are embodied in specific laws. Among these framework acts, the 
Framework Act for Development of Broadcast and Communication and the Framework 
                                                 
37 Framework acts also can be translated as “basic acts” and is usually called the latter in Japan. 
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Act on Cultural Industry Promotion contain articles mentioning content industry. The 
Framework Act on Intellectual Property emphasizes the relations between IPR and 
digital content industry, and clarifies roles of the Presidential Council on Intellectual 
Property. 
Legal environments need to be improved consistently in a way that connects 
structural holes, but the conflict is unavoidable among ministries. Optimized 
jurisdiction of each act is essential in order to provide actual benefits to the participants 
of content industry. 
 
 
5.3.3 Major actors of digital content policies  
 
5.3.3.1 Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism  
MCST is a central government agency responsible for the areas of tourism, 
culture, art, religion, and sports. Launching after 1990
38
, the Ministry of Culture has 
been responsible for the areas of culture that can improve the quality of life for the 
general public. In 1993 and 1998, tourism and sports were folded into the ministry as 
part of government reorganization, but the overall policy system of MCST did not 
change over the last decade. In connection with digital content, current MCST is the 
most actively working ministry with a relatively large budget and significant human 
resources. After the Cultural Industry Division was established in 1994, it expanded and 
                                                 
38 When the First Republic was established in 1948, the governmental organization in charge of culture 
was originally a sub-organization of the Ministry of Education. Although the Ministry of Culture and 
Information existed from 1968, the primary goals of the ministry were regulating media and promoting 
traditional culture. 70% of the total expenditure on the cultural sector during 1974–1978 was distributed 
into folk arts and traditional culture (Yim, 2002). 
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reorganized into the Culture Content Bureau in 2001. In addition, the Culture Media 
Bureau was launched in 2004, and the New Media Industry Team was organized under 
its umbrella in 2007. To enlarge its jurisdiction and to absorb the Ministry of 
Information and Communication’s functions for digital content policy, the Culture 
Media Bureau and the Cultural Industry Bureau merged into the Cultural Content 
Industry Office in 2008.  
MCST has two vice ministers, three assistant ministers, one commission, and over 
sixty divisions. As Figure 5.4 shows, previously separate functions of digital content 
policy are now operating under the single umbrella of MCST’s authority. One of the 
affiliated organizations, the Korean Culture and Information Service, contributes in 
operating the Korean Cultural Centers
39
and monitors new global trends in digital 
content. The Korean Overseas Information Service launched as a sub-division of the 
Government Information Agency in 1999. It became a part of MCST while being given 
its current name in 2008. Among its thirty-seven overseas offices in twenty-one 
countries, twelve branches are located in East Asia including Tokyo, Osaka, Beijing, 
Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Singapore. This shows the importance of the East Asian 
market to the Korean content business as well as its soft power policy. 
 
                                                 
39 The Korean Cultural Centers originally aimed to provide opportunities for experiencing Korean 
traditions and history through specialized programs for the general public. Coping with the increasing 
demand for Korean content, the centers sponsor many pop culture events and language learning resources. 
It is run by the Korean Culture and Information Service under the supervision of International Culture 
Affairs Division of MCST. 
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Figure 5.3 Sub-organizations of the MCST involving digital content 
 
Source: Modified by the author using data from MCST official website.    
  http://www.mcst.go.kr/english/ministry/organization/orgChart.jsp 
 
From the late 1990s to the early 2000s, MCST competed with the Ministry of 
Information and Communication through their sub-organizations, projects, and related 
laws. With the dismantling of the Ministry of Information and Communication, however, 
most of the works involving content-related policies were transferred to MCST, which 
started to take on a profound role in digital content governance. 
 
5.3.3.2 Korea Creative Content Agency 
KOCCA is dedicated to promoting the content industry and has particularly 
close ties with MCST. It was established as a comprehensive support system to enhance 
the efficiency of content policies that were separately pushed forward with the Korea 
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Broadcasting Institute, the Korea Culture and Content Agency, the Korea Game 
Industry Agency, the Cultural Contents Center, and the Digital Contents Business 
Group of the Korea IT Industry Promotion Agency until 2009. 
Differing from other divisions in the governmental ministries, KOCCA provides 
practical counsel angled towards small-size firms. Interviewees mentioned that experts 
in KOCCA had the higher degree of understanding for the content industry, and were 
supportive in developing specialized content technologies. Furthermore, KOCCA 
encourages digital broadcasting projects, promotes online game distribution, and carries 
out digitalization projects aimed at strengthening content competitiveness in the 
worldwide market. Those activities have been conducive to the improvement of the 
factor conditions in the field of the content industry (Kim, 2011) [57]. Among KOCCA’s 
major goals–developing content technology, commercializing content, promoting 
overseas sales—interviewees noted that the information about overseas markets was the 
most helpful service for their projects, and requested for service for legal advice in the 
foreign market. The survey was conducted in 2005 resulted that over 70 percent of 
content productions in Korea expected to the Korea Culture and Content Agency would 
invest in ICT infrastructure and digital distribution technologies, but this changed 
considerably under technological development. 
KOCCA set up a unified dialog channel and played an important role in adjusting 
and connecting the private and public sectors. This collaborative network might be said 
to be a bottom-up process in terms of the organizational aspect within the government. 
On the contrary, it has not been established in a systematic way, and has limitations in 
managing conflicts among governmental agencies. This demonstrates that the activities 
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of KOCCA have contributed to the initial formation of the infrastructure of the content 
industry rather than the innovation system as a whole. 
 
5.3.3.3 Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning 
The creation of MSIP was one of the current Korean President Park Geun-hye’s 
core pledges during her presidential election campaign in 2012. In 2013, MSIP was 
launched under a reorganization plan initiated by President Park to generate new growth 
engines for the Korean economy. All of the tasks related to science and technology, 
especially ICTs, previously distributed among various departments were combined into 
one ministry. Yet this move was criticized for its unclear defining of jurisdictions, 
despite it being the most striking and central feature of the government restructuring. 
Policies and regulations, which had been under the Ministry of Information and 
Communication until 2007, were transferred to KCC, MKE and MCST in 2008. 
Policies for promoting media technologies, which had been handled by KCC, were 
delegated to MSIP, and the second vice-minister put in charge as presented in Figure 4. 
While KCC still exists, its functions are limited to a regulatory role. 
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Figure 5.4 Sub-organizations of the MSIP involving digital content 
 
Source: Modified by the author using data from MSIP official website. 
  http://english.msip.go.kr/english/wpge/m_70/eng0505.do 
 
 MSIP is designed to flexibly respond to technological changes in digital content. Its 
expertise under new media policies such as IPTV service operators, satellite channels, 
and digital media broadcasting is outstanding, but it still has a long way to go before it 
can provide tangible benefits for content producers. Interviewees indicated that they had 
already settled into the system by MCST and KOCCA, so less expectant of new projects 
that MSIP would provide. An interviewee suggested that MSIP would secure its own 
area by bridging “structural holes” that are not covered yet by other ministries. The 
Cyber Security Policy Division and the Information Culture Division under the IT 
Strategy Bureau and Software Policy Bureau have distinct expertise that MCST cannot 
 87 
cover. The lack of technological expertise caused by the job rotation system needs 
urgent improvement.  
 
5.4 Findings and Implications  
 
5.4.1 Inter-ministerial conflicts and the location of structure holes 
5.4.1.1 Japan 
The Japanese government has been trying to reform economic environment in 
response to rapidly progressing technologies and globalization since the 1990s. It has 
identified the content industry as one of five potential areas of growth, but some 
criticize that the Japanese government did not advance the country's business interests 
in digital sphere, allowing Korea to emerge as a competitor.  
 As Figure 5.5 shows, the strong initiative has caused policy conflicts in the field of 
content trade and sales since 2011. Not only METI, but the MOFA is also extending a 
cultural exchange program and JETRO supporting global promotion for Japanese 
content since the late 2000s. Like other information policy, content technology mainly 
leaded by the METI and concluded it adjusted to policy coordination under the 
leadership of the IT Strategic Headquarters (Sunada, 2007) [30]. Moreover, while it 
looks as though enough connections have been made in the aspect of IPR, in reality they 
are limited to conventional media. Even while secondary usage of existing content 
through the Internet became widespread, cyber security and privacy, payment systems, 
and electronic signatures for online distribution still remain as structural holes. 
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Figure 5.5 Inter-ministerial networks for developing digital content in Japan 
  
Secondly, Japan is the consistent challenge in its attempts to set up a control tower 
for policy coordination. As mentioned above, the problem of policy coordination by the 
Cabinet is too weighted towards the traditional concept of IPR and its protection. 
Intellectual property is intimately connected to the content industry because it consists 
of both industrial property and copyrighted property (Yoshimoto, 2003) [53]. 
Institutions such as the Japanese Society for Rights of Authors, Composers and 
Publishers (JASRAC) built by music publishers and management companies as a non-
profit organization in 1939. In addition, Japan Patent Office can take the leading 
position among the ministries in reviewing and revising the intellectual property of 
 89 
digital content as well. Changes for improving the efficiency of public R&D investment 
will be needed in any control tower for IPR. 
However, fear of illegal copying meant that content could not be distributed for 
overseas residents through the Internet. Japanese content producers have been troubled 
with copyright protection in a foreign market since the 1990s. The issue of the high 
percentage of illegal piracy especially in East Asia caused the Japanese content industry 
to limit its investment to online distribution. Thus, for a foreign market, major Japanese 
content companies only released packaged compact disc (CDs) or DVDs. Even in the 
domestic market, major television stations sued Nagano Shoten and Nippon Digital 
Kaden, companies that had offered remote video services in the early 2000s. In order to 
address these challenges, the corresponding facilitation of IPR and secondary use in the 
overseas market began being discussed under the collaboration of the parties concerned 
such as broadcasters, rights-holders, and the government. Without the leadership of the 
IT Strategic Headquarters, it would not be possible to bridge structural holes that would 
be beneficial to the whole organization and finally aiming policy coordination. 
 
 5.4.1.2 Korea 
The Korean government has continuously increased the budget for support 
programs of content technologies and industries since the 1990s. Figure 5.6 shows the 
network among governmental ministries and agencies involving digital content. First, 
the area of broadcasting policy shows duplicative efforts between MSIP, KCC, and 
MCST. In 2010, a case of policy competition was exposed through their jurisdiction 
conflicts between MCST and KCC, with Article 4 of the Content Industry Promotion 
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Act requiring revision in order to secure the Framework Act on Broadcasting and 
Telecommunication Development. There is also an example of policy coordination that 
devolved into competition, surrounding the content identification system between 
MCST and the Ministry of Information and Communication that lasted from 2005 to 
2008. Faced with increasing demand for managing the code system of content, MCST 
developed a “Content Object Identifier (COI)” but the Ministry of Information and 
Communication invested in a “Universal Content Identifier (UCI).” They had a similar 
purpose of managing the content distribution process with transparency, but competed 
for budget and recognition as the primary standardization process (Son, 2007) [58]. 
After the Ministry of Information and Communication was dissolved, as well as the 
system for promoting content technologies, UCI merged with COI and coordinated 
together under the governance of MCST. 
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Figure 5.6 Inter-ministerial networks for developing digital content in Korea 
 
 Some interviewees especially on government’s side indicated that most competitions, 
including the previous case, were intentionally designed for promoting the 
competitiveness of each ministry in the early stages of digital content development. 
Because the Korean content market was immature, policymakers decided both 
approaches needed to be similar to the developmental state model and fostered 
competition among ministries. In the early 2000s, they evaluated that such strategies 
could maximize policy efficiency. 
Secondly, the results of the analysis revealed that there are structural holes in the 
intellectual property and the Internet policy area. There is the Office of Intellectual 
Property Strategy and Planning under MSIP, but it is isolated from other agencies. For 
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sustainable development of the content market, a life-cycle management system of IPR 
should be introduced under the understanding of digital distribution, as well as 
investigation undertaken concerning the present conditions of the IPR system.  
Finally, the inter-ministerial network faces organizational changes every five years 
when a new president is inaugurated. Despite that the president’s role in digital content 
policy is more limited than in Japan, the president’s influence is still too crucial to be 
neglected. In 2012, the restructuring of the government by President Park looked to set 
up so-called “control towers” that were to take charge of integration and communication 
in content policy. MSIP took shape as one of these control towers for ICTs at the second 
vice-minister level, but the function of promoting digital content is still dispersed. For 
policy coordination, the entire government needs to get involved, with communication 
between corporate and civil society stakeholders being coordinated by the control tower. 
 
5.4.2 Common challenges faced by Japan and Korea 
5.4.2.1Government organizations and policy efficiency 
Due to global economic liberalization, both the Japanese and Korean 
governments have generally avoided the developmental state model based on state-
initiated economic or technology planning, and sector-specific promotion. Instead of 
direct supports, both governments in the late 1990s and 2000s began to pay closer 
attention to the concept of national innovation systems (NIS). NIS emphasizes that a 
country’s innovative performance largely depends on how research producers relate to 
each other as elements of a collective system. Under this view, the organization of 
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government and its decision making processes play a pivotal role in the development of 
digital content technology. 
The regulatory institutions and legislations vary in both countries. In Japan, MIC 
administers the technological part of content industry constantly, whereas the related 
institutions activated and inactivated over time in Korea. The activities of the KOCCA 
and Cool Japan initiatives have affected the improvement of the knowledge network in 
the field of content industries. The creative collaborative network among industry, 
academic, research development and public sphere has not been established in a 
systematic way.  
As seen in UK’s Government Digital Service Design Principles, open governance 
can be realized through a flexible economic system and creation of new relationship 
connected by formal institutions. The first principle emphasized that a government 
should consider real user needs not ministries’ purpose. For understanding those needs 
thoroughly, it should interrogate data instead of making assumptions (Gov.uk 2012). 
Also, it notes that a government should do what only it can. If someone else is already 
doing it, a government should share what it does with users, share code, ideas, even 
failures. 
 
5.4.1.2 The direction of content policies after digitalization 
Digital content is an example of digital convergence and of policy conflicts that 
should be considered when new technology makes an appearance in the future. Digital 
content policy includes aspects of “cultural policy40,” “technology policy41,” and 
                                                 
40 Among examples that provided in Chapter 5, the open door policy is close to cultural policy. 
41 Intellectual property rights including Digital Rights Management (DRM) or the Internet security and 
privacy involved in technological aspect of content policy. 
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“industrial policy42.”  This can be applied to policy conflict with the emergence of other 
technologies as well.   It has been adopted that vertical structure for the content 
regulation, but policymakers in charge of digital content development have been forced 
to rethink it because a horizontal regulatory structure can be more efficient within the 
convergent environment wherein digital content can be easily stored and distributed 
through the Internet. In this respect, it is necessary that the policy paradigm should be 
transformed from the fragmented support system to the integrated support system.  
There needs to be a collaborative network for policy innovation and a performance-
oriented support system for the technological development of digital content (Yoo, 
2005) [59]. Inter-ministerial competition existed in the developing stages of digital 
content in both countries; such competitions were planned intentionally for policy 
effectiveness sometimes. However, it cannot be said that is efficient when technological 
development reached a plateau. Content policies in recent years became more balanced, 
and seemed to be found natural coordination among ministries. For example, the Japan 
Foundation under MOFA tried providing e-learning content as a part of their ODA 
programs, and the Agency for Cultural Affairs under MEXT supported overseas market 
expansion by providing subtitles or captioning assistance. 
Another point of the content policy implications that must be considered is that 
creativity is the core competence of digital content. A point that relates to the NIS is 
divided into key innovators and the innovation environment. The key innovators cover 
the government and public organizations. The innovation environment is associated 
with the factor conditions, knowledge environment and network environment. 
Yoshimoto (2003) suggested building an infrastructure for non-profit creative activity 
                                                 
42 Taxation issues and fiscal environment are specific to digital content. 
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and related incubators for the content industry [53]. Furthermore, the government 
should make an effort to manage policy uncertainty through the promotion of the 
creation and application of knowledge. 
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6. Cases of Content Technologies and Policies in East Asia  
 
6.1 Methods and data source 
 
Japanese and Korean governments’ policies and regulations had been played 
certain roles when resuming market structure. However, it is also pointed that civil 
adaptation for specific technologies was more than an influential factor for content 
industry. Even there are few clues that can explain causality, or even correlations, this 
chapter tries case study research comparing the Cool Japan strategy and the culture 
technology initiatives of Korea.  
Technology also can change the pattern of content use. Inter-activity becomes 
common and wireless network links devices at the same time. Not only limited to Japan 
and Korea, cases of Internet content uploaders can be generalized for discourses as 
global level distribution. 
Moreover, this chapter seeks to examine policy efficiency that was reviewed in 
Chapter 5 through enhancing content export in which it can be one of the primary 
objectives of the Japanese and Korean content policies.  
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6.2 Japan: Cool Japan Strategy 
 
6.2.1 Emergence of Cool Japan  
 
Japan fascinated with the concept of “soft power” and tried expanding its 
cultural influence since the 1990s. In the early 2000s, Japanese content was shed new 
light as the effective tool for enhancing Japanese soft power. McGray (2002) coined the 
term “Gross National Cool43,” and pop culture or even sub-culture such as the costume 
play was expected to promote sales of Japanese product in the global market [61]. In the 
face of a declining domestic market, the government under the concept of “Cool Japan” 
encourages foreign demand for Japanese content as well as consumer goods and 
services to help total economic growth (Thomson, 2013). In the overseas markets, rather 
than media content alone, products and services as a whole tend to be deployed at the 
same time [62]. 
Why Japan built a grand strategy for promoting its content distribution to other 
states?; What roles have the government and firms?; How the Cool Japan strategy 
changes the relationship between the public sector and private firms involving media 
content? 
While the development of the content industry is being focused, Japanese content 
only shares a small portion of overseas markets. As Chapter 3 shows, the size of 
Japanese content market is around 122 billion USD, but is only 2.3 percent of the GDP; 
lower percentage when compared with other states. Even worse, the sales of domestic 
content remain sluggish last seven years.  
                                                 
43 McGray (2002) introduced the term gross national cool (GNC) as a yardstick for comparing the soft 
power of countries, and Japan was ranked in sixth place among fifteen developed countries. He cited 
Japan as an example of how a country that was not a superpower in the military sense could nevertheless 
project its influence and culture across the globe. 
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  6.2.2 Cool Japan Strategy  
 
The concept of Cool Japan turned to the specific government initiative named 
as “the Cool Japan strategy” in 2010 when METI established as the Creative Industries 
Promotion Office, so-called the Cool Japan office. In 2011, the budget of Cool Japan 
was initially allocated at 19 billion yen under the Democratic Party. The Cool Japan 
strategy is based on the idea that Japanese small and medium-sized enterprises often 
make attractive and high-quality content but do not have the capacity to invest in 
overseas distribution. The Abe administration continues to support the Cool Japan 
strategy. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo mentioned that Japan’s strengths in content are 
attracting attention from the world, and will make the content industry into a world-
class business from the speech for members of the Diet in February 2013 (Nikkei, 
2013/08/14) [63]. 
It has set up a Cool Japan fund in 2013, administered through METI, with promised 
backing of 50 billion yen. It is hoped that a further 10 billion yen will be raised through 
contributions from the private sector, including banks and the bigger manufacturers. 
Cool Japan funds are used to help them expand abroad in return for a small equity stake 
in the participating businesses (Thomson, 2013) [62]. It means that policymakers find 
structural holes in the weak marketing and planning of the content production side. 
Indeed, Japanese content firms that are engaged in distribution such as broadcasters 
have been powerful mainly in the domestic market as its HHI reflected in Chapter 3, 
and there was almost no advancement into overseas markets with some exceptions. 
Therefore, there was a problem of weak marketing and planning in the content 
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production side. To expand sales overseas, it is necessary to conduct production and 
business structuring assuming overseas expansion. 
Similar to other “soft power” initiatives, the economic output of Cool Japan fund is 
hard to measure. A significant relationship between Cool Japan expenditure and trade 
volume is not found. There is a possibility that time lag exists for showing a certain 
level of performance.  Even though the overlapped policies were indicated in the early 
stage of Cool Japan, the policy in recent years became more balanced and found natural 
coordination among ministries. In the Cabinet, the minister in charge of the Cool Japan 
strategy coordinates different government functions, and cooperates with the private 
sector as well. 
 
  6.2.3 Public-Private Partnership  
 
One of the most prominent traits of Cool Japan Strategy is the public-private 
partnership. It is one of the strong points of the Japanese policy network for digital 
content development. Major firms in the content industry have enough scale to negotiate 
in a parallel position with the government. There are organized associations that could 
represent themselves such as the Japan Association for the International Promotion of 
Moving Images (UNIJAPAN), the Council for Promotion of Digital Content, the Digital 
Content Trading Promotion Committee, and the Digital Content Association of Japan 
(DCAJ). 
In 1991, entertainment companies established the Multimedia Association of Japan 
among stakeholders in the content industry, which merged and changed names in 1996 
and 2011 to DCAJ. DCAJ’s role is similar to that of Korean (KOCCA), publishing the 
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Digital Content White Paper, promoting technological developments including 
computer graphics or other visual effects, researching overseas trends in the CG and 
VFX industry, and business-matching with Asian countries. In particular, DCAJ 
implemented a comparative survey of the markets in the three countries of Japan, China, 
and Korea in cooperation with public sectors in China and Korea, collated information 
on the content market in other overseas countries, and investigated and examined the 
situations for sales and development of Japanese content into overseas markets (DCAJ, 
2014) [37]. The Japanese government, especially MIC, has a cooperative relation with 
those associations and holds public debates and re-examines proposals with them.  
The public-private partnership was possible because of a tradition among content 
companies in Japan. The structure of content industry in Japan is horizontal among 
sectors such as an advertisement sector, distribution sector, and production sector 
(Tanaka, 2009) [64]. Content production companies have been formed the Production 
Commission System as a cooperative organization to invest together and to share risks 
and returns. The relationships among the members of the Production Commission are 
equal and autonomous. Each subsidiary company can expand its own business in 
specialized areas, and companies that have not participated in the Production 
Commission can use the original content by purchasing a license. Especially, it is 
possible to introduce new ideas freely without setting the scope of using original 
contents in advance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 101 
6.3 Korea: Culture Technology for Korean Wave 
 
6.3.1 Emergence of Korean Wave 
 
The global market shares of Korean content industries have been increased over 
time especially between 2002 and 2007. During that period, content policies in Korea 
have seen a continuous increase in terms of government budget and public support 
programs. Korean content policies response to the transnational cultural flow—the 
Korean Wave—spreads different ways in each stage. At the earlier stage, it meant 
popularity of the Korean pop culture. But it is interpreted widely into 'a phenomenon in 
favor of Korean commodities in the later stage. As Chapter 3 mentioned, the size of 
Korea’s content market in 2012 was 55.2 billion USD, 5.2 percent increase yearly, 
derives from the game and broadcasting industries. Korean content became the most 
influential factor in the survey as “a major reason for visiting Korea,” and indicated the 
economic effects of Korean Wave could never be ignored. 
The Korean Wave is a comprehensive socio-cultural phenomenon caused decisively 
by the rapidly increasing demands in East Asia for new media content, which may well 
be attributable to the revolutionary development of the broadcasting technologies. 
Another reason for the popularity of the Korean content in East Asia is that developing 
countries in East Asian whose priority is put on economy seem to hope to develop 
themselves similar to Korea. They have been looking for their ideal economic 
development model from Korea.  
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6.3.2 Effects of Korean content policies and the Korean Wave 
  
Spreading the Korean Wave and its involved policies cause various problems as 
well. In particular, extremely commercialized programs exported with high price, and 
foreign countries are refusing Korean Wave emotionally because of its unilateral spread 
(Min, 2006). The extreme case of the “anti-Korean Wave,” revealed in Japan. The 
offensive content export policies of Korea, especially in South East Asia, causes soft 
power competitions between Japan because content consumers who enjoyed Japanese 
content regard Korean content as a substitute. Advance in a cramming way “anti-Korean 
Wave” will also discuss in Chapter 7. It requires trying differentiated approaches for 
sustaining the Korean Wave. It is necessary to approach as mutual communication that 
would be formed into international cultural exchanges.  
The Culture Technology (CT) policies are relatively free to antipathy, but it is not 
certain that the content policy has affected the competitiveness of content industry in 
practice. To assess whether Korean CT policies affect positively to content consumers, 
the researcher gathered information through a survey of Japanese content consumers 
who attended the K-pop concert sponsored by the Ministry of Information and 
Communication (MCST) in Korea on June 2016. The purpose of the survey was to 
understand Japanese content users’ perceptions and opinions about content policy, and 
their experiences with Korean content. The survey instrument was developed by a team 
of community members supported by Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA) Japan 
office who adapted questions from several studies on related topics was conducted at 
other researches.  
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This chapter selects the most pertinent results corresponding to questions asked in 
the survey. The full text of the survey questions and other related information can be 
found in KOCCA (2017) [65].  The survey was sent to all concert attendances, yielding 
a total response rate of 53 percent. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 The Genre of Korean content that have used 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Frequency of Korean content use 
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Among 523 respondents, over 60 percent people answered that they were watching 
or listening to Korean content every day (Figure 6.2). This indicates that survey 
respondents are enthusiastic Korean content fans. In addition, as shown in Figure 6.1, 
the experiences of watching or listening various kinds of Korean content show that the 
Korean Wave in Japan has entered a mature stage. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Path to Korean content purchase 
 
Moreover, even 56% of respondents were in their 40s or older, the online usage rate 
is the highest (Figure 6.3). Online streaming is ranked as the most popular way to enjoy 
K-pop (Figure 6.5), and the third of the broadcasting content.  
 
298 
251 
39 
73 
58 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Online Record/Book
store
Retail shop Others None
Where do you buy Korean content? 
 105 
 
Figure 6.4 The ways to watching Korean broadcasting content 
 
 
Figure 6.5 The places listening to music 
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6.3.3 Changing directions to Culture Technology 
 
As Chapter 3 mentioned, the size of Korea’s content market in 2009 was 56.7 
billion USD, 4.1 percent increase yearly, derives from the game, music and broadcasting 
industries. The Korean Wave is a comprehensive socio-cultural phenomenon caused 
decisively by the rapidly increasing demands in East Asia for new media content, which 
may well be attributable to the revolutionary development of the broadcasting 
technologies.  
The evolution of content policy in Korea has seen a continuous increase in terms of 
government budget and public support programs. However, it is not certain that the 
public policy has affected the competitiveness of the content industry in practice. It is 
essential to establish the national innovation systems (NIS) in order to improve the 
competitiveness of the digital content industry. In this respect, it should be necessary to 
argue the relationship between the policy outcome and the innovation system of the 
digital content technology. Nevertheless, the support system of the KOCCA has been 
conducive to the improvement of the factor conditions in the field of content industry. 
The creative collaborative network among industry, academic, research development 
and public sphere has not been established in a systematic way, because convergence 
environment of media, technology and culture is not established.  
Korean digital content policy is mainly focused on technological development 
instead overseas sales or IPR. There was an example started the completion surrounding 
the content identification system between MCST and the Ministry of Information and 
Communication from 2005 to 2008. Increasing necessity to manage code system of the 
content, MCST developed “Content Object Identifier (COI)” but the Ministry of 
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Information and Communication invested for “Universal Content Identifier (UCI).” 
They had the similar purpose that managing content distribution process with 
transparency, but competed for its standardization process and budget for holding 
hegemony (Son, 2007) [58]. However, as mentioned in 5.4.1.2 interviewees indicated 
competitions including this case were strategically designed for finding the best fit of 
each ministry in the early stage of digital content development. Because Korean content 
market was immature, some policymakers regarded that it was needed that the approach 
similar to the developmental state model, but encouraged competition within the 
government for maximizing policy efficiency. After the Ministry of Information and 
Communication was dissolved, as well as the system for promoting content 
technologies, UCI merged with COI and coordinated together under the governance of 
MCST. 
Due to these negative issues, so once the next-generation industry, stature and 
interests of the country was a big help to the content industry had any impact on this is 
to evaluate the current status. Content-based industrial conglomerates in the domestic-
oriented sub-structure are already starting to tumble to learn that the fast and efficient 
production of offshore development has not kept up the structure rather than weakened 
by the large-scale capital structure of the industrial structure and professional staff base 
for searching that gradually began to diminish, and examined. 
To solve these problems, the MSIP to the editorial about the need for 
competitiveness with other countries for the Information Security Policy and 
management review to assess the reorganization of the Organization sees. And related 
to the content industry development and management policies of the government 
proposal for the thesis is to propose and evaluate the elements (Jung 2011) [66]. 
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6.4 Technologies and motivations of Internet content distributors 
 
As Ariely (2009) mentioned, the open-source software shows the potential of 
social norms. In the case of Linux and other collaborative projects, a user can post a 
problem about an operating error on one of the bulletin boards and find how fast 
someone, or often many people, will react to his or her request and fix the software—
using their own leisure time. The cost that a user should pay is much less than the level 
of service usually [67]. People in these open-source software communities are happy to 
give their time to society at large. There are social rewards that strongly motivate 
behavior—and one of the least used in corporate life is the encouragement of social 
rewards and reputation. 
Creating web content costs less than producing or distributing traditional content 
generally. On the demand side, broadband use has become more participative as users 
upload content, increasing demand for upstream bandwidth. For suppliers, technologies 
lower entry barriers and a corresponding rise in new business models have facilitated 
the emergence of innovative content and applications (PwC, 2007) [20]. 
However, this lower entry level makes web content market as high competitive and 
the concept of attention economics is an approach to the management of information 
that treats human attention as a scarce commodity, and applies economic theory to solve 
various information management problems. (Davenport and Beck, 2002) Simon noted 
that many designers of information systems incorrectly represented their design 
problem as information scarcity rather than attention scarcity, and as a result they built 
systems that excelled at providing more and more information to people, when what 
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was really needed were systems that excelled at filtering out unimportant or irrelevant 
information (Simon 1996). The problem of information overload as an economic one 
has become more popular. 
Lassic’s open software supposes the creative commons which can be more 
effectively developed under the shared knowledge than exclusive societies. It stimulates 
a lot of digital content in the website, but some software needed very elaborating jobs 
did not when the economic reward not guaranteed. In other words, some might critic 
that only wealthy people who do not need urgent economic support can join developing 
open ware just for fun. It might be threatened open ware’s responsibility or credibility; 
worse under-developed or developing states avoid with the chance to develop their own 
creativity. 
Byun and Choi (2009) researched Korean content creators' motives for and their 
psychological attitudes toward production of digital content. They conducted five 
rounds of Focus Group Interview (FGI) for twenty subjects, and thereby, analyzed the 
results of the interview qualitatively. Researchers set a framework of preparatory 
analysis for the data collected and reanalyzed the same data to suggest a theoretical 
model about web content users' attitude toward a reward. As a result, it was found that 
the active media users had shown five different kinds of internal rewards (self-decision, 
sense of efficacy, self-expression, social exchange and commitment), which 
corresponded correctly to users' psychological reward mechanism. In addition, they 
were found to accommodate characteristics of the online media network only to 
reinforce their earlier internal motives [68]. 
As Web 2.0 movements are rapidly spreading into the online environments widely, 
the boundary between producers and users of digital content are becoming blurred. 
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Users are now becoming producers at the same time and the user generated content that 
normal users create and share among themselves voluntarily will be prevailing on the 
web. Intrinsic motivation and social norms that already set down under the freeware 
movement became a very important momentum of content production. So, the public or 
private sectors who would like to promote web content production and its usages need 
to join this positive interaction rather than pecuniary profit. It should be also considered 
not much creative UGC has been produced with the rapid increase of illegal copy and 
nominal modification. Behavior economics will provide a new platform of those 
discussions as well. 
 
 
6.5 Implications to East Asian content policies 
 
In East Asia, regulatory factors play important roles when each economy 
resumes their market structure or promotes specific businesses. In Japan and Korea, 
there were direct economic or technology policies already existed from the 1960s, and 
some industrial technologies including chemicals, steel, shipbuilding, and 
semiconductors were fostered under governmental initiatives. It is well known that 
Japan and Korea industrialized under strong interventions of governments, as well as 
extensive regulation and planning (Woo-Cumings, 1999) [69]. Following the 
phenomenal economic recovery of Japan after the end of the Second World War, newly 
industrialized countries in East Asia emerged a decade later to represent the 
developmental state model with different kinds of business-government relationships 
(Johnson, 1982). Private sectors were rigidly guided and restricted by government 
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ministries; subsequently, the developmental state model came to suffer from the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997-1998, which led to the collapse of many economic systems in 
Asia.  
Notwithstanding, the myth of the developmental state model is still remaining in East 
Asia and applies to soft power competition until now. Before digitalization, media 
content was not treated as a strategic industry under the developmental state model. 
Until the mid-1990s, media content was regulated or promoted by the culture-related 
ministries of the respective countries: the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism 
(MCST) in Korea and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology (MEXT) in Japan. But with the digitalization of traditional media blurring 
boundaries between culture, technology, and industry; ministries involved in science 
and technology, economy and trade, or foreign affairs from the late 1990s onwards 
started developing proposals for promoting digital content industries. As it mentioned in 
Chapter 5 and 6, Japanese and Korean governments come to the front and set up direct 
ideas to promote digital content development. The Korea Creative Content Agency was 
founded in 2008 as a government plan to turn Korea into a cultural superpower in the 
world content market; Japanese Creative Industries Promotion Office under METI 
facilitates content industries’ overseas expansion under the long-term concept of Cool 
Japan. Castells (2004) cited Japan as the prime example of developmental strategy. Not 
only Japan, Korea-China-Taiwan-Singapore ruled for a long period by the same political 
party, which facilitated the development of a powerful network involving government 
members. They control and guide significant economic-related activity, and 
technological development as well. Similar policies were adopted in China, Hong Kong 
and Taiwan. 
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China began to rapidly transform into a market economy after Deng Shao Ping's open 
door policy in the 1990s. Also, developing satellite broadcasting and digital 
technologies made Chinese media consumption patterns changed. Their demands for 
media content had been increasing steadily, and weaken protectionism temporally. 
However, it is operating a mechanism to protect their culture as well as the content 
industry after 2010. China began to reduce or stop to import foreign content for their 
television programs.  
The media industry of Hong Kong was reached its peak in the late 1990s. Hong Kong 
has only two commercial free to air stations Television Broadcasters Ltd.(TVB) that 
began broadcasting in 1967 and Asia Television (ATV) started 1969. Both TVB and 
ATV are receptive to foreign content. They translate imported content, mainly Japanese 
animations and Korean TV dramas into the local Cantonese dialect. Buying foreign 
content has practical reasons that reducing financial risks inherent to new product. The 
government implemented the open sky competition schedule.  
Taiwanese government also pays attention to the content industry, and selects it as 
one of eight strategic industries
44
as a legal environment.45 Financial support based on 
national research and development (R&D) fund, not storyline or specific performers but 
platform technology including computer graphics or 3D movie technology (Silvio, 
2007) [70].  
Singapore government counts the digital media industry as one of major national 
projects as a part of their current ICTs promotion plan (iN2015).  The role of IDA was 
regarded a successful example not only for their agenda itself, but also their solid legal 
background to promote ICT, intellectual property right or deregulation about Internet or 
                                                 
44 新興重要策略性産業奬勵辦法 
45數位內容產業發展條例, 數位展藏內容受權曁同意使用作業綱領, 線上遊戲定型化契約 
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media industry for example, stimulate many prominent ICT companies establish their 
branch in Singapore. Even in Singapore which has the strict censorship in the content 
industry, people can access easily websites which are containing illegal content in 
specific states. After develop ICTs, web hosting servers can located in foreign country. 
 Government intervention or protectionism increased vigilance of other cultures or even 
stimulates nationalist sentiments and protest will be described in Chapter 7 action and 
protectionism to increase.   
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7. Discussion and Reflections on Findings   
 
7.1 Content distribution and nationalism   
 
The Internet, the most prominent media for digital content distribution recently, 
enables information exchange beyond territorial boundaries. During the early stage of 
Internet development, cyberspace was expected to provide the proper sphere for cross-
border communication and had potential to create cosmopolitanism (Poster, 1999) [71]. 
When the costs of producing, storing and distributing digital content decreased, it 
became easier to share one’s idea through cyberspace. However, the extended 
opportunity did not guarantee rational communication or mutual understanding. Often, 
chauvinistic words were observed in cyberspace, and some felt that the Internet 
development created a new type of nationalism—cyber nationalism. 
 The Internet has been used in building national identities
46
; Some states distribute 
public content based on national myths or symbols through the Internet to enhance 
nationalism (Eriksen, 2006) [72]. Internet media intensifies nationalistic sentiment in 
East Asia through exaggerated reports about sports events, territory disputes or 
historical issues (Oishi 2008 [73]; Park 2009 [74]). As a result, cyber nationalism 
becomes as a global phenomenon in 2010s. Caiani et al. (2013) analyzed the role of the 
Internet on the identity-building processes of right wing organizations in France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and United States. She was exploring both 
                                                 
46 Discussing the role of media in forming and spreading nationalism, previous researches also pointed 
out other traditional media how they have been distinctly engaged in nationalism. McLuhan (1986) states 
that in making imagination of social boundary identical to boundary of languages the role of newspapers 
is more important than books. Benedict Anderson (1983) mentions that it was radio broadcasting that 
catalyzed imagining a nation among illiterates. 
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online networks and offline activism, in the relationship between militancy and 
communication technology, and concluded their use of the internet influences their 
mobilization and action strategies. A lot of groups use the Internet as a tool to set their 
agenda, build contacts, spread their ideology and encourage mobilization [75]. 
It is difficult to establish universal tendencies about the correlation between the ICTs 
development or digital content use and nationalism. There were some prior works to 
examined the correlation between frequency of the Internet use based on time and 
national identity or affinity with foreign countries. Nam (2010) examined how 
quantitative and qualitative aspects of the Internet use correlate with national identity. It 
investigated how often the Internet is used and how influential it is in selected states. 
Then, it examined the correlation of the Internet use and national identity, and conduct 
cross-national comparison of these results [76]. Adapting her methodology, this 
research examines the correlation between frequency of the Internet use and nationalism 
in East Asia, it is conducted Pearson’s chi-square test (χ2) based on the 
AsiaBarometer
47
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47
 AsiaBarometer is a comparative survey for understanding political and social relations of people in 
Japan, Korea, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and Vietnam in mid-2000s. This survey was 
conducted in mainland China and Hong Kong separately. The size of each country’s sample is 1,000 
persons except China whose size is 2,000. 
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Table 7.1 Questionnaires concerning nationalism 
 Question type Recorded Answer 
Choices 
1 How proud are you of being [YOUR COUNTRY'S 
PEOPLE]? 
 1.Proud  2.Not 
Proud 
2 [YOUR COUNTRY’S] traditional culture is superior 
to that of other countries. 
 1.Agree 2.Disagree 
3 Central government should restrict the inflow 
of foreign workforce to protect domestic people's 
interests 
 1.Agree 2.Disagree 
Source: Inoguchi, T. AsianBarometer Survey Data 2006 [computer file]  
 
Three questions in Table 7.1 adapted as indicators that could show the degree of 
nationalism. Internet usage also was categorized as three (High-Mid-Low) levels of the 
frequency. In Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan the percentage of high 
and mid-level of Internet use is close to or more than 50 percent, and more the nature of 
this correlation varies. 
As it shown in Table 7.2, though in some countries the correlation existed, the degree 
of correlation was not strong but both linear and nonlinear correlations were found 
among Japan, Korea and China. It is rather to say that the ICTs, especially access to 
digital content, are the prerequisite of formation of a new type of nationalism. 
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Table 7.2 Frequent of Internet use and national pride 
 
Country Internet 
Use 
Frequency 
Proud  
n     (%) 
Not Proud 
n     (%) 
 Total 
Count 
Pearson 
Chi-Square  
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
China  High 1268 89.6 146  10.4  1409 
6.37 0.04   Mid 238 85.3 41  14.7  279 
 Low 225 85.9 37  14.1  262 
Hong Kong  High 324 75.5 105  24.5  429 
4.25 0.12 
  Mid 92 68.1 43  31.9  135 
 Low 326 76.9 98  23.1  424 
Japan  High 412 84.8 74  15.2  486 
13.20 0.00 
  Mid 111 74.0 39  26.0  105 
 Low 251 76.3 78  23.7  329 
Singapore  High 419 92.7 33  7.3  452 
0.22 0.90   Mid 78 92.9 6  7.1  84 
 Low 434 91.9 38  8.1  472 
South 
Korea 
 High 308 86.5 48  13.5  356 
10.43 0.01   Mid 114 76.6 44  23.4  188 
 Low 374 79.2 98  20.8  472 
Taiwan  High 364 69.3 161  30.7  525 
21.88 0.15   Mid 49 46.2 57  53.8  106 
 Low 234 68.2 109  31.8  343 
 
***p<0.001  
Source: Nam, 2010; Inoguchi, T. AsianBarometer Survey Data 2006 
[computer file]  
 
It is rather to say that the Internet and the development of ICTs are the prerequisite of 
formation of new type of nationalism. Depending on content distribution, Internet users 
have been an explosion of nationalism. Recent public discourse on the cyberspace is 
excessively ethnocentric especially among East Asian states. 
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The cyber nationalism in East Asia is a distinctive phenomenon derived from the 
interacting of multiple factors including history, politics, culture and technology.  
Masked under the anonymity of the Internet, the Net right
48—people who post 
chauvinistic or ethnocentric texts—vents their political spleens on the Japanese popular 
online bulletin board. They accumulate their own nationalistic discourses on specific 
websites, and mobilized people by using social media. A number of researches say the 
dominant cultural purpose of the Net right is amusement and not aberration, and its 
cyber-attack is not always an object of serious reflection. But the spreading of mutually 
understood negative ideations is not desirable because it contributes to the development 
of nationalistic fervor and aggressive tones to a broader audience. 
There are two strains of literature that have explained the advent of cyber nationalism 
in East Asia: economic or technological changes. Takahara (2006) had attention to the 
Net right was mainly made up with males in 20s or 30s who had low-income part-time 
jobs that enlarged after 1990s [77]. Suzuki (2008) said the Net right’s main purpose was 
venting frustration, both about Japan’s diminished stature and in their own personal 
economic difficulties [78]. Yasuda (2012) regarded the Net right phenomenon as an 
alarming side effect of Japan’s long economic and political decline. His research interest 
had turned toward to the Zaitokukai
49
 and its ethnocentrism after the East Japan 
earthquake in 2011 [79]. 
                                                 
48 Literal translation of “ネット右翼” is “Internet right-wing.” Because of its original pronunciation, it 
can also translate as “Net Uyoku” or abbreviated “Netto uyo.” 
49 Zaitokukai (在特会) is the abbreviation of the Zainichi Tokken wo Yurusanai Shimin no Kai that means 
“Citizens against special privileges for foreigners in Japan.” “Zainichi” originally designates foreigners 
who staying in Japan, however, usually means ethnic Koreans and Chinese permanently living in Japan. 
Chinese and Korean diaspora has long and complex history and each shares 29.6% and 27.6%* of total 
foreign residence in Japan. (*Immigration Bureau of Japan, 2009) 
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On the other hand, some researchers focused on the technological traits of the 
Internet that bring transformation of nationalism in Japan and other neighboring 
countries. Wu (2007) stressed on the active role of Internet media in boosting 
nationalism in contemporary China and East Asia, and captured certain aspects of the 
new style of production of nationalism. He had provided clues to understand the 
mechanism of intensification of nationalism under widen Internet media coverage and 
its use by governments [80]. Suzuki (2008) pointed out ICTs that changed the way of 
communication interactively, and allowed to use anonymity of cyberspace. He 
interpreted that these changes provided new environment for formation of collective 
identity of the Net right and enable to express hatred towards minorities regarded as a 
taboo in public [78].  
Keeping distance from the technological determinism, this chapter overviewed how 
ICTs and digital content interact with nationalism in East Asia. Firstly, this chapter aims 
to identify the characteristic of nationalism in the Japanese and Korean cyberspace 
starting in the late 1990s, and especially focuses on the relations between digital content 
distribution and emergence of cyber nationalism. For describing specific features of the 
cyber nationalism in Japan and Korea, it mainly focuses on the prominent case of side 
effect that Korean content distribution in Japan coactions the Net right.  
The Net right is a heavy Internet user who sends ultranationalist messages to online 
bulletin board or blogs repeatedly. This term spread in the Japanese cyberspace from 
late 1990s as a deprecating title, and treated as a new social phenomenon in the 
Japanese media soon. When their early stage of development, the Net right showed 
similar tendencies with traditional right-wings: support the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) , insist to amend the Article 9 of Japanese Peace Constitution that outlawing war 
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as a means to settle international disputes, advocate politicians visiting Yasukuni Shrine  
that was blamed as the enshrinement to Class A war criminals, require to sing the 
national anthem “Kimigayo” or to raise the national flag “Hinomaru” at schools (Mie, 
2013) [81]. The Net right, different from traditional right-wing, insisted that the 
outbursts of anti-Korean and Chinese rhetoric when Korean media content started to be 
popular in Japan. Because of the Korean pop culture boom in Japan, negative sentiment 
was muted in the early 2000s. As the boom faded, however, anti-Korean sentiment grew 
online. 
2channel (2ch)
50
, the biggest bulletin board system (BBS) in Japan, regarded as a den 
of the Net right and notorious for hate speech against minorities in Japanese society. 
After launched in 1999, 2ch has over 700 text boards treating various topics. Only less 
than ten boards
51
 deal with topics drew the Net right’s attention. The Net right’s 
activities—so-called trolling—to post articles related to the topic but defamation of 
Korea or China hindered rational discussions. Even if there was the policy that illegal 
postings defined under Japanese law had deleted, massive size and anonymity of 2ch 
made difficult to prompt response to hate speech. Contextually related to activities in 
the 2ch, the Net right interconnected and annotated in Mixi
52
, Yahoo news
53
, or Nico 
Nico Doga
54
. In the comments section of those websites, the Net right aimed to create 
extreme tone and eye-catching general Internet users. The number of the Net right was 
assumed as 1.2 million (Tsuji, 2009) but seemed to doing active role [82]. Even the Net 
right does not represent mainstream society in Japan, anti-Korea or anti-China 
                                                 
50 http://www.2ch.net Japanese pronunciation is “ni channeru” and abbreviated “2ch.” 
51 “Breaking news,” “East Asia News+,” “Wars & conflicts,” “Korean,” “China,” or “Korean drama.” 
52 https://mixi.jp Mixi is a popular social networking service in Japan. 
53 http://headlines.yahoo.co.jp/cm/list 
54 http://www.nicovideo.jp Niko Niko (ニコニコ) is one of popular video sharing website in Japan. This 
website was ranked as the eighth most visited website in Japan on September 2015. 
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sentiment exposed Internet users often and fresh layers can be created. Although most 
Net right remained in cyberspace, it happened that some of them connected right-wing 
media or political parties (Yasuda, 2012) [79].  
Cyberspace became a new public sphere and increased political participation without 
strong leadership or financial support. The Net right in late 2000s started to utilize not 
only Japanese BBS or social networking service (SNS), but also international forums or 
official websites of foreign governments as a tool which strengthen their political beliefs. 
It has gradually expanded its playing field from online to offline. In July 2011, Japanese 
actor Takaoka Sousuke mentioned on his Twitter account that Fuji Television Network 
for excessively airing Korean TV dramas. Motivated from his comment, the Net right 
complained about context of Korean television programs and Korean government 
policies to promote overseas content sales. Around 600 (on August 7
th
, 2011) and 5,000 
(on August 21
st
, 2011) people attended demonstrations against the Fuji Television 
Network in front of the headquarters located in Odaiba, Tokyo. The Net right did a key 
role for planning demonstrations, encouraging people to attend, or even broadcasting 
demonstration as live videos through Ustream
55
 and Nico Nico Doga. These 
demonstrations of the Net right have shaken the belief that transnational content 
distribution can promote mutual understanding seems to be broken.  
Content policies in Japan and Korea mainly focused on positive effects of content 
export, but there is now a need to consider causes of emerging anti-Japanese or anti-
Korean sentiment within trading partners. The sense of cultural crisis from importing 
sides seems to have fueled from “patriotic marketing” of the web-based media. Pay per 
                                                 
55 http://www.ustream.tv Ustream is a company that its starts its business in the United States. It provides 
video streaming services since 2007 and has seen significant growth in Japan after launching Ustream Asi
a service in 2010. 
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click online advertising system makes online newspapers or magazines in Japan, Korea 
or China treat more provocative issues especially based on nationalism. 
Some people exploit digital content with the goal of extending nationalistic discourse, 
and SNS becomes a useful tool for self-organized nationalist communities. Furthermore, 
free online translators have relieved language barriers between Japan and Korea and 
between Japan and China. Thus, the aggressive expressions of other sovereignties are 
able to be distributed to other countries without a time lag.  
These side effects need to be reduced by increasing cultural understanding among 
East Asian economies based on their mutual cultural acceptance. It is needed to enhance 
the content by establishing export strategies after different cultural characteristics are 
carefully considered and expanding exports through a media of wide communications. 
 
 
7.2 Direction for a future East Asia cooperation  
 
The current trends of globalization have led to new intracultural flows within 
East Asia. East Asia has yet to establish the lowest denominator for any meaningful 
regional integration, while clearing impediments such as security uncertainties, lack of 
confidence, and prevailing skepticism among many politicians. Still, regional 
cooperation based on content distribution within East Asia has not yet reached a level of 
mutual understanding. Even the level of political and security cooperation remains at a 
very nascent stage, despite the ever-increasing socio-economic interdependence. 
In content businesses in a foreign market, competition and benchmarking intensely 
occur between Japan and Korea. Japanese content until the early 2000s, in East Asia, 
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has been rapidly increasing the influence and even showed superiority in competition 
with the US content. In recent years, Korea was regarded as competing to Japanese 
content distribution in East Asia. 
Contemporary East Asia cannot be considered a homogeneous entity. East Asia goes 
beyond the stereotypes to explore the cultural dynamics of the region. In fact, 
globalization is reducing the world, and has prompted people in the world to take more 
notice of other cultures and cultural difference. Using survey data from East Asian 
Social Survey (EASS)
56—a cross-national survey project which covers four East Asian 
states. The results show that the level of distribution of East Asian identity differs 
among societies, and that an East Asian identity are positively correlated with a national 
identity. They also show that English proficiency, travel experience to foreign countries 
in this region, and cultural contacts with neighbor countries through content fosters an 
East Asian identities (Uenohara, 2013). 
As Figure 7.1 shows, negative images to Korea have been replaced with positive 
images with the increase of content import in Japan. The increase in the number of 
people who feel affinity to Korea in the period of 1999-2004 and 2009-2011 is in tune 
the first and second Korean Wave boom in Japan respectively. Recently, the proportion 
of people who feel affinity has decreased for political issues, but international co-
productions can provide the opportunity for diversifying content, and for 
communicating with consumers better.  
 
 
                                                 
56 East Asian Social Survey (EASS) is a biennial social survey project that purports to produce and 
disseminate academic survey data sets in East Asia. It is based on Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS), 
Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS), Korean General Social Survey (KGSS), and Taiwan Social 
Change Survey. 
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Source: Cabinet office of Japan, Annual survey of Japanese diplomatic relations, retrieved from 
http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/index-gai.html 
 
Figure 7.1 Japanese general perception to selected countries 
 
Moreover, content distribution can show the particularity of East Asian, and the 
possibility of regional cooperation. For example, the popularity of the Japanese and 
Korean content in the East Asia has been attributable to the cultural background; the six 
East Asian states have closely interacted with each other throughout the long history. 
Culture and moral values derived from Confucianism have been cultivated and shared 
among them through exchanges, so people were easily sympathized with the other 
Asian countries’ content. Sometimes Japanese and Korean content played as buffer zone 
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for people who feel difficulties to accommodate western culture directly, and relieved 
them from culture shock. Since Asian TV dramas describe a daily life and general 
experience, it can be the key medium to increase the understanding people from 
different backgrounds. 
Content describing daily life can be a medium to understand other culture. The 
cultural sphere did not yet reaching to a certain level of mutual understanding among 
East Asian states (Kwon, 2006). Chinese and Taiwanese people often shows sensitive 
response on others’ content including propaganda, and some Koreans are in their 
infancy to accept Japanese and Chinese content. Chinese and Taiwanese viewers show 
sensitive response on nationalism, and Korea is in its infancy to accept Japanese and 
Chinese television content. Territorial and historical disputes are still troubling countries 
in this part of the world simultaneously, so-called as the Asian Paradox.  Bitter 
memories prevented the states from achieving genuine reconciliation during the 20th 
century. During the Second World War, Japan was ruling some East Asian states with 
military authority and it causes bad impression in invaded countries. This trauma under 
Japanese colonized is still kept alive in the media through anti-Japanese movement or 
the campaign against Japanese content. 
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Figure 7.2 Korean general perception to Japan 
 
Figure 7.2 shows that over fifty percent of Koreans feel still distant to Japan, even 
the total content import from Japan to Korea is exceed than Japanese imports. There are 
possibilities that promote cooperation through content distribution. Some empirical 
studies reveal that use of digital content weakening nationalism. Smith and Phillips 
(2006) analyzed the survey about different media content and perception about Australia, 
and concluded that usages of television-radio-newspaper strengthen one’s national pride 
whereas the Internet use shows the opposite effect [83]. Slaughter (1997) noted the 
provision of content on the Internet created a de facto norm of freedom of information 
that would change political systems, that was a culture of pluralism and tolerance and of 
freedom of expression [84]. 
These evolutionary shifts are providing chances to content producers and consumers, 
and also widen the possibilities for changing international relations in East Asia. This 
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hints at the possibility that a new process is overtaking functionalism, where order shifts 
from economic cooperation to a political, and then to cultural community. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
 
This research has attempted to establish an illustrated analysis for content 
distribution networks among six East Asian economies over a recent decade, and to 
compare this region’s policies that promote the content industry with a focus on Japan 
and Korea. In East Asia, thanks to digital technologies and increased consumer buying 
power, content delivery within the region has become prevalent and is evolving rapidly. 
However, content policies raise several questions about their effectiveness and can 
provoke various internal and external reactions. 
The findings of this research showed, a certain level of correlation between content 
exports and government expenditures for content development, but this does not imply 
causation. Additionally, during the initial stages when profitability has not been 
achieved, content should attract R&D funding thought its commercial value appeal. 
Furthermore, it must be considered that creativity is the core competence of the content 
industry. Unlike sales or technological development, content is difficult to evaluate or 
promote through economic support. 
The digitalization of content brought about internal reactions, including policy 
conflicts. It can be an example of technological convergence, and structural holes 
should be considered when new technology makes an appearance in the future. External 
reactions toward governmental interventions in the content industry, including policy 
competition and cyber nationalism within the region emerged in the late 2000s. These 
reactions can potentially threaten East Asian cooperation. 
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The major findings of each chapter are highlighted as follows. Chapter 3 shows that 
content production and distribution in Japan and Korea changed dramatically between 
the late 1990s to the 2010s. It was concluded that the East Asian content trade network 
became far more decentralized and distributed during this period. In quantifying the 
relations among the six East Asian economies, it was found that the types of networks 
are changing and there is a deepening of mutual interdependence within the region. The 
dominance of Japanese content has weakened, but not faster than other changes in the 
total trade market. The influence of China in the content sphere is not stronger than its 
influence in other industries.  
Chapter 4 presents a map that defines centers and boundaries based on 
TeleGeography’s global Internet bandwidth data. The development of ICTs forced the 
content industry to utilize digital technologies for its production and distribution, and 
this led to the current boom in digital content distribution in East Asia. In contrasting 
trade data and Internet traffic, it was found that Japan is still dominant in Internet traffic 
flow. 
Chapter 5 focuses on Japanese and Korean content policies that promote content 
distribution in East Asia. Inter-ministerial competition existed in the developing stages 
of digital content in both countries; such competition was sometimes intentionally 
designed to promote policy effectiveness. However, it cannot be said that it remained 
efficient when technological development reached a certain plateau. Ministries and 
agencies’ coordination were attempted through reorganizations and program 
management, but despite these new governmental networks, structural holes can still be 
found in the field of content distribution technologies including online streaming in 
Japan and intellectual property in Korea. However, the existence of structural holes does 
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not always mean that knowledge or skills in the field are vulnerable. Even if there is a 
gap, sometimes the ambiguity is rather advantageous for long-term profits. 
Chapter 6 examines the Cool Japan strategy and the culture technology initiatives of 
Korea as the new type of East Asian content policies. It attempts to clarify the relations 
between government initiatives and content market growth. In trading media content, 
regulatory factors play an important role but this was not accounted for in this analysis 
and requires further investigation. 
Chapter 7 attempts to gauge the socio-cultural influences of content distribution in 
East Asia. For evaluating the impacts of content policies, a wide range of ripple effects 
should be considered as well. This chapter focuses on content as a source of soft power. 
While hard power consists primarily of the military and economic capabilities of a 
country, soft power arises from a country’s culture and values. Soft power became 
influential in the post-Cold War period when the threat of hard power was diminishing. 
However, these evolutionary shifts are just entering the early stages, and the positive 
impacts of relations among the six economies were not widely felt until today. This 
research notes that the cultural sphere has not yet reached a certain level of mutual 
understanding. Some people exploit digital content with the goal of extending 
nationalistic discourse, and free online translators have relieved language barriers 
between Japan and Korea, and between Japan and China. Thus, the aggressive 
expressions of other sovereignties are able to be distributed to other countries without a 
time lag. It was unforeseen by many policymakers and scholars that policies involving 
digital content technology would be criticized as state-interventionism or 
developmentalism unsuitable under the current global economy. 
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In sum, content distribution networks within the six East Asian economies shifted 
toward a nonhierarchical form between the late 1990s and the 2010s. The change in the 
content distribution network in East Asia from a centralized to a distributed form is 
similar to the development of the content delivery network (CDN) that served a large 
proportion of the Internet content during the same period.  
Regarding policy aspects, it is not the goal of this research to measure only the 
economic effects or to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of a specific content policy. From 
through late 1990s through the 2010s, the digital content industry's boom has resulted in 
growth and has recently entered a mature stage.  This research stresses the need to 
consider the side effects of content policies from a critical view as well. Nevertheless, 
there is still a need for governments to make an effort to manage policy uncertainty 
through promoting the creation and application of new knowledge. Governments must 
play an indirect yet pivotal role regarding regulation and mediation, moving from the 
centralized and hierarchical structure of the past to a more decentralized and horizontal 
structure. In this respect, it is essential to establish national innovation systems to 
improve the competitiveness of the digital content industry.  
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